ECO and its future as a non-Arab regional bloc

Photo by ECO Secretariat

*This commentary is simultaneously published in  Foreign Policy Journal, Middle East Online, OpEdNews and Global Politician

The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), comprising Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and six Muslim former Soviet republics, recently held its latest summit meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, where President Ahmadinejad handed over the rotating presidency of this regional organization to President Abdullah Gul of Turkey. ECO is a low-profile regional economic integration organization, headquartered in Tehran, which was originally founded by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan . Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, ECO expanded its membership to the Muslim Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union as well as Afghanistan. ECO has so far gained modest achievements in the area of commercial and economic cooperation among its members despite a plethora of preferential commercial and economic agreements signed among its member states over the past two decades.

The three founding members of ECO act as the key players of this regional organization as most of the acceded members still remain uncertain about the benefits of deeper regional integration within ECO. Turkey’s role in ECO is primarily driven by its interests in gaining preferential access to the markets of other member states, a fact which explains why it is the major driving force behind trade liberalization in the ECO region. Iran initially weighed political benefits from regional integration under ECO more heavily in its calculations than its potential economic gains, as it provided Iran a break from isolation by its hostile neighboring Arab countries in the 1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran has also viewed ECO as a framework for promoting its geopolitical position as a transit route for the land-locked Central Asian republics. Increased international diplomatic pressure on Iran over its nuclear program in recent years has increased the political stake of ECO in Iran’s eyes.

Two major developments are particularly noteworthy about the latest ECO summit held in Istanbul. First, the attendance of Iraqi president Jalal Talabani as the head of a non-member state at the ECO summit was a new development for this regional grouping. Talabani’s attendance makes particular sense in light of the fact that Iraq has officially applied for membership in ECO. Membership of Iraq in ECO would mark a break from the non-Arab identity of this regional organization and would pave the way for the membership of some other Arab countries in this organization. In light of the geographical interconnectedness of Iraq with other key ECO member states, ECO would serve as a natural setting for the regional economic integration of Iraq . Iraq’s integration within a non-Arab regional bloc may ring the alarm bell for conservative Arab sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf region as it highlights further alienation of Iraq from these countries due to their antagonistic policies toward the post-conflict democratic Iraq and their reluctance to accept Iraq in the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council. Regardless of regional reactions , by seeking membership in ECO, Iraq has taken a major step in using regional capacities to promote its national interests.

The second major development highlighting the latest ECO summit in Istanbul, is the continued lukewarm attitude of most Central Asian republics toward deeper economic integration within ECO, as demonstrated by their low-level presence at this meeting. Apart from Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, none of the remaining Central Asian members of ECO participated at the head of state level in this meeting. This fact just further highlights these countries’ uncertainties about potential economic gains from deeper economic integration in the ECO region. Their lukewarm attitude is driven by their fear that deeper economic integration, promoted as the main objective of ECO, would leave their domestic markets at the mercy of the more competitive producers of key ECO member states, primarily those of Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran and Pakistan.

Despite the lack of enthusiasm shown on the part of several small members of ECO toward further regional integration, diverse incentives hold the member states of ECO together on the path to further regional cooperation. Future membership of Iraq would give a momentum to this regional organization and would open new avenues for cooperation among its member states. Given their geographic locations, Syria and Armenia can also serve as other natural potential candidates of membership in ECO, even though the membership of Armenia would face serious political obstacles on the part of Azerbaijan and Turkey in the event of its application. Notwithstanding challenges facing deeper economic integration within ECO, this regional organization has the potential of developing into a more formidable regional bloc, thus providing its members with a larger bargaining power vis-à-vis other regional and global economic blocs in the future.

Welcome to Iran Diplomacy Watch

The weblog "Iran Diplomacy Watch" kicks off today December 25, 2010. Iran Diplomacy Watch  aims to provide independent analysis of Iran's foreign policy developments and welcomes intellectual contribution from all interested observers of Iran's foreign policy. I look forward to receiving your feedback as this weblog builds itself up. 

Abolghasem Bayyenat  

www.irandiplomacywatch.com

What if Iran becomes a nuclear-armed state?



The article reproduced below was originally published on January 17, 2006 in the Antiwar.com under the title of “ If Iran gets nukes: deflating the hysteria”. Although five years has passed since I originally wrote this article, the arguments presented therein are still applicable.

Although Iranian and EU officials have recently agreed to resume talks on Iran's nuclear activities, there is little optimism that such talks will lead to any breakthrough in the existing deadlock over Iran's nuclear program. As senior Iranian diplomats and nuclear negotiators have remarked, Iran is determined to continue work on the nuclear fuel cycle despite Western countries' threats to have the UN Security Council impose economic sanctions and/or other coercive measures.

Western foreign policy think tanks and intelligence centers have speculated that if Iran is allowed to resume its uranium-enrichment activities and other sensitive nuclear work, it might be able to build nuclear weapons within a period ranging from five to 10 years. Given such a possibility, Western politicians and political analysts have warned of the repercussions a nuclear Iran would have for the security and political stability of the region and the world. The dramatization of this alleged threat has resulted in the adoption of a tough and unwarranted position by Western countries toward Iran.

The frequently cited fears about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran are that Iran might use nuclear weapons in a first strike against its adversaries in the region (or, if equipped with advanced delivery systems, further afield), or that Iran's nuclear weapons might slip into the hands of terrorist groups dedicated to harming Western nations. But are such fears well-founded, and to what extent has the threat of a nuclear Iran been exaggerated? Finally, how reliable would a nuclear Iran be?

Most Western politicians and observers say their attitude toward Iran's nuclear activities is justified by the character of the Iranian regime. Critics are skeptical about Iran's ability to behave as a responsible member of the international community, and they often refer to the revolutionary and, allegedly, fanatical origins of the regime as reasonable grounds for suspicion. The climate of mutual distrust and anxiety has been aggravated by the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but Western fears of Iran are often unreasonable.

First, it would be a mistake to think that the character of the Iranian government has remained unchanged since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In fact, the Islamic Republic has lost much of its revolutionary and ideological fervor over the past two decades, and its government has mellowed considerably. Iran's has demonstrated moderation and pragmatism in its foreign policy of recent years, as national interests and strategic calculations have taken precedence over ideology.

Iran's determination to maintain close relations with Russia serves as a conspicuous example in this regard. As part of a policy aimed at giving priority to its strategic ties with Russia above all else, Iran has kept silent over the suppression of Muslim separatists and the violation of human rights by the Russian army in Chechnya. In a similar development in the mid-1990s, Iran and Russia used their influence on the Tajik Islamist opposition group and the secular, formerly communist government of Tajikistan respectively to put an end to the long-lasting civil conflict in that country, a nation with which Iran enjoys common cultural and linguistic bonds. Iran's pragmatic decision to collaborate with Russia in brokering a peace deal between Tajikistan's warring parties, instead of supporting the Islamist militants, bolstered Iran's growing ties with Russia.

Iran's cordial relations with Christian Armenia despite its military conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan also stands in contrast to the prevailing view that Iran's foreign policy is driven primarily by religious and ideological considerations. Iran's position on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, for which it has received harsh criticism from some political groups in Azerbaijan and other Muslim countries, shows the overriding importance of national interests in Tehran's decision-making.

Another notable demonstration of the precedence rational choice takes over ideology in Iran's foreign policy is its largely neutral stance regarding the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan. This position has enabled Iran to maintain good relations with both sides. The ongoing negotiations between Iran, India, and Pakistan over a multi-billion dollar project to export Iranian natural gas to India via a pipeline in Pakistan is the most prominent concrete gain resulting from this policy.

Iran's shift from ideology to pragmatism is also illustrated by the normalization in recent years of its relations with the conservative pro-Western nations in the region. The easing of political tensions in the region has resulted in the expansion of economic relations between Iran and its neighbors, indicating Iran's desire to give priority to creating a favorable climate in the region for pursuing its economic goals.

Iran also played an effective role in helping opposition groups allied with U.S. forces topple the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan. It has contributed significantly to the development of democratic processes in post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq and has undertaken substantial financial responsibilities for the reconstruction of both countries. These two cases prove that Iran is willing to collaborate with even hostile states, such as the U.S., in areas of common strategic interests. A similar process has been going on for years between Iran and the European Union in fighting Afghan drug-trafficking, for which Iran has paid dearly in both human lives and money.

The only major issue that runs counter to the mainstream, pragmatic trend in Iran's foreign policy is its hardline stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given the popularity of the Palestinian cause among Muslims in the region and around the world, Iran's policy on the Palestinian issue is shaped by its desire to curry favor with the global Muslim public. The recent controversial comments by President Ahmadinejad about Israel should be interpreted in line with the above observation, as a tactical appeal to the sentiments of the Muslim masses. However odious its leaders' statements, the Iranian government has confined itself to issuing rhetoric rather than taking any significant practical measures to undermine the Middle East peace process.

Second, the notion of Iran launching a first-strike nuclear attack against any of its adversaries is absurd, as all its potential target countries are already either in possession of nuclear weapons or are under the nuclear umbrella of other powers. Given the viable retaliatory capability of such countries, any nuclear attack by Iran would result in its own assured destruction. Reason dictates that a nuclear weapons capability would serve Iran only as a deterrent against potential aggressors.

Third, while it would be controversial to argue from a religious perspective against possessing nuclear weapons for deterrent purposes, given the indiscriminate destructive nature of nuclear weapons, any nuclear attack against civilian population centers would definitely be against the ethical teachings of Islam. This consideration should serve as a check against a hypothetically nuclear-armed Iran misusing its nuclear weapon capabilities.

Fourth, there are no credible grounds to fear that Iran might arm terrorist groups with nuclear weapons to attack Western nations. Itself a longtime victim of terrorist attacks, Iran should feel no sympathy with terrorist groups who disapprove of its Shi'ite and Persian identity and whom it blasts for tarnishing the image of Islam through violent extremism. Iran is often referred to by visiting Western journalists as having the most pro-Western youth population in the region. While I can neither confirm nor reject this claim, no Iranian citizens have been implicated in any terrorist acts conducted in Western countries in recent years.

Finally, as Iran has no record of military adventurism or aggression against any of its neighbors in modern history, there is nothing to suggest that a nuclear-armed Iran would be any less peaceful than any other nuclear states in the region. In fact, while the world comes to terms with nuclear-armed Pakistan, India, Israel, etc., it would make little sense, if any, to overplay the threat of a potentially nuclear Iran. The discriminatory enforcement of nonproliferation in the region will not be sustainable.