Russia’s new policy shift on Iran’s nuclear issue

 

 *This article is simulatenously published in the Middle East Online and American Chronicle.

Russian officials have made a series of statements on Iran’s nuclear program over the past several weeks which highlight a significant shift in their balancing position between Iran and the West. The most recent statement to that end was made by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev last week at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In a statement countering the dominant conception of Iran’s nuclear program in the West, Medvedev remarked that there is no proof that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons . This statement came a few days after President Medvedev held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, discussing bilateral relations and Iran’s nuclear program and after Iran’s Vienna-based envoy to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, traveled to Moscow in mid January to hold talks with Russian policy-makers over Iran’s nuclear program.

As in the case of similar statements challenging the conventional view of the Western political elites toward Iran’s nuclear program, Medvedev’s recent statement unsurprisingly did not receive coverage by the mainstream Western media. The censorship of Medvedev’s recent statement by the mainstream Western media does not of course detract from the importance of Russia’s new position on Iran’s nuclear issue.

Medvedev’s recent statement on Iran’s nuclear issue is not the only evidence pointing to a shift in Russia’s balancing act between Iran and the West. Other lower Russian officials have also made similar statements with the same effect regarding Iran’s nuclear issue over the past several weeks. The recent warm-up in Russia-Iran relations follows a period of tensions between the two countries which emerged after Russia, under pressure from Israel and the Unites States, reneged on its commitment to deliver S-300 surface to air missile system to Iran and after it joined the Western powers in voting for another round of Security Council sanctions against Iran in June 2010 .

The recent shift in Russia’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear issue can be understood in the context of the changing international circumstances overseeing Iran’s nuclear issue. Since Iran’s nuclear activities turned into a full-blown international issue several years ago, Russia has played a double game in order to secure its national interests in relation to both Iran and the West . First, Russia has had to be cooperative with the Western powers at the UN Security Council in order to have a say in formulating international policies shaping political outcomes around the world and also to use its cooperation with the West as a bargaining tool to gain concessions from it in other issue areas, such as its relations with the NATO and economic cooperation with the Western countries. This would make particular sense for Russia’s interests as its non-cooperation with the Western powers would have induced them to bypass the Security Council and to seek alternative arrangements dealing with Iran‘s nuclear issue , which would exclude Russia. Second, Russia , at the same time, also had to appear supportive of Iran by watering down the tone of the sanctions resolutions in order to preserve its strategic relations with it.

　

In practice, however, walking a fine line between Iran and the West has not always played out safely for Russia as it has involved the constant risk of alienating one party to the benefit of the other. Indeed this turned out to be the case last June when President Ahmadinejad of Iran publicly expressed his frustration with Russia over its vote for the last Security Council resolution against Iran, even after it had significantly watered down the language of the resolution. Iran’s anger at Russia for its perceived betrayal was not confined to public statements by Iranian officials. Iran’s initial practical response to Russia’s shifting position on Iran’s nuclear issue as well as its refusal to deliver S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to it was to order all Russian commercial pilots working in Iran to leave . Even though, non-political reasons were mentioned for terminating the work contract of Russian pilots in Iran, the timing and the publicity surrounding this announcement could not fail to reveal Iran’s political motives.

Apart from concerns about further backlash against its economic interests in Iran and its eagerness to maintain its strategic ties with it, the recent shift in Russia’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program is also driven by the US unilateral approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue in recent months, including imposing further tough sanctions on Iran through bilateral arrangements with other countries. At a recent press conference held jointly with Turkish foreign minister, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, referred to unilateral sanctions against Iran as a spoiler and expressed hope that they would be lifted in the nuclear talks between Iran and the P-5+1 countries, which was held recently in Istanbul . Along the same lines, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also stated recently that sanctions against Iran are futile and that the only way to deal with Iran's nuclear issue is diplomacy.

Regardless of Russia’s principled opposition to crippling economic sanctions against Iran, it would particularly oppose any arrangements dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue to which Russia is not a part. As the US takes a more unilateral approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue, Russia will find itself more leaning toward Iran and is expected to work to undermine those additional punitive measures against Iran which are formulated outside the context of the UN Security Council.

Iran-P-5+1 nuclear talks conclude in Istanbul; what led to the failure?

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and EU  foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton ,at the recent Istanbul meeting, Photo by Reuters



The latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P-5+1 countries, comprising the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, concluded today Jan 22, in Istanbul, Turkey, without any specific agreement. As usual , the mainstream Western media are busy attributing the failure of the recent talks to Iran’s alleged intransigence while turning a blind eye to the inflexible and unreasonable position of Western powers in regard to Iran’s nuclear issue.

To see what led to this failure, let’s examine what brought each party to the negotiating table in the first place . Western officials were interested in discussing two main issues with their Iranian counterparts at the Istanbul meeting , namely Iran’s uranium enrichment program and nuclear fuel swap. The first item was a non-starter for negotiations as Iran had agreed in the previous round in Geneva, to continue the talks on only common grounds. As Western officials could well anticipate, Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was not a matter of common grounds and thus not up for negotiations, as Iranian officials had publicly warned about weeks before the Istanbul meeting.

Iran’s position that it has the right under the NPT to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and that it is not ready to negotiate over its obvious rights has become a cornerstone of its nuclear policy over the past several years. Iran has also actualized its goal of developing nuclear fuel cycle technology by developing industrial-scale enrichment facilities over the past decade. In light of these realities, various Western political think tanks and prominent American Iran specialists had warned the American officials in recent months that it would be unrealistic for the Western powers to expect Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program .

As in contrast to its Western interlocutors, Iran tried to focus discussions on common grounds, which included items such as nuclear disarmament, scientific nuclear cooperation, Israel’s nuclear arsenal and so forth. Not surprisingly, the Western officials were lackluster about discussing these issues, as they perceived them as tangential to their main agenda. Iran was also ready to resume talks on its nuclear fuel swap proposal at the Istanbul meeting, taking into account the new realities that have emerged since it initially tabled its proposal.

The nuclear fuel swap issue had the potential to salvage the recent nuclear talks in Istanbul. Iran had initially offered to exchange most of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in return for ready fuel rods for its research reactor in Tehran back in October 2009 and later again in May 2010 (as part of a deal negotiated between Turkey and Brazil on the one side and Iran on the other). Western powers had rejected both of these offers by Iran and had pressed ahead with further Security Council sanctions against it. Iran had meant its nuclear fuel swap offers to be confidence-building measures in part in order to allay Western powers’ concern that it might be pursuing nuclear weapons and also to prevent further sanctions against it .

Despite some hopes for a rudimentary agreement on the issue of nuclear fuel swap, Western powers proved in the recent talks in Istanbul that they were not prepared to adjust their calculations and have realistic expectations about a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran either. Western negotiators still wanted to finalize the deal with Iran on the same terms that was proposed in October 2009, not taking into account the new realities, including further multilateral and bilateral sanctions imposed on Iran. Put differently, Western powers wished to strip Iran of most, if not all, of its LEU stockpile and at the same time maintain the sanctions that they have imposed on it since then and even threaten it with more sanctions.

Given the original purpose of the nuclear fuel swap proposal by Iran and the fact that Iran has produced more LEU since then, it is reasonable for Iranian negotiators to have expected the Western powers to recognize Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear fuel cycle under the NPT and ease sanctions on it in return for giving up most of its LEU stockpile. Any deal that would not meet these minimum requirements, could not be sold by Iranian nuclear negotiators to their constituency back in Iran.

The failure of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and Western powers is yet another evidence that Western politicians are not yet willing to adjust their expectations in light of the realities on the ground. This has made the Western position with regard to Iran’s nuclear program seem even more unreasonable and unrealistic. Western officials had hoped in vain to reap the fruits of their intensified sanctions against Iran in the recent nuclear talks in Istanbul. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, had even attributed the very fact of Iran coming to the negotiating table to her policy of tightening sanctions. But as I had argued earlier in my previous works, these hopes were not to see the light of day and that the Western confrontational policy towards Iran was only likely to further toughen Iran’s position on its nuclear issue and thus bring about a lose-lose outcome.

　

　

A time not for celebrating victory over Iran

President Ahmadinejad touring Iran's uranium enrichment center at Natanz

* This article is simultaneously published in Foreign Policy Journal, American Chronicle, Online Opinion and OpEdNews.

Over the past few days, the dominant mood of Israeli media has been one of euphoria and celebration over the recent announcement by the outgoing Israeli intelligence chief, Meir Dagan, that even under worst-case scenarios Iran will not be able to build nuclear weapons at least by 2015. Referring to the latest revised assessment by Dagan of the chances of nuclear weapon development by Iran and similar adjusted assessments over the past decade, an Israeli intelligence analyst writes, “These adjustments were not the result of mistaken evaluations, but due to the difficulties Iran has encountered in advancing its program, largely because of the Mossad’s efforts”.

Along similar lines, another Israeli self-identified ‘dove’ political analyst expresses his content with Dagan’s recent announcement by writing, “although blowing up some Iranian facilities and killing a few Iranian scientists were risky acts of aggression, they were worth it. They contributed to the hobbling of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, pushed its goal off by at least several years, so these acts of sabotage and assassination were justified,”.

These celebratory observations do not only characterize the mood of Israeli media and politicians . Many Western media and politicians also feel euphoric at the thought of Iranian nuclear program being disrupted by covert acts of sabotage. To cite only one example, Washington Post wrote in a recent editorial reflecting on Dagan’s recent assessment that, “there appear to be solid reasons to conclude that U.N. and other Western sanctions and covert operations have hindered the Iranian program” and that “without more advanced centrifuges, Iran would have trouble in any attempt to create a bomb out of the low-enriched uranium it has stockpiled”.

What accounts for this celebratory mood at the exaggerated news of damage to Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities is the now-too-familiar assumption that Iran is hell bent on developing nuclear weapons and that the fact that Iran has not so far built nuclear bombs is because of the joint Western and Israeli covert operations and pressures. If anyone happens to ask Israeli or western politicians as to what evidence they have to believe that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, the familiar answer would be that it is Iran’s job to prove that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. In other words and absurdly enough, Iran is presumed guilty unless proved otherwise. This explains why, under pressure from world powers, the IAEA periodic reports over Iran’s nuclear program routinely state that they are not yet able to fully establish that there is no military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program, rather than simply stating that there is no evidence that Iran’s nuclear program has military dimensions. The international controversy over Iran’s nuclear program simply boils down to this unverified assumption that Iran is determined to produce nuclear bombs.

　

However, no one among Western politicians seems to want to consider this plausible argument that the fact that Iran has not yet developed nuclear weapons is not because of technical difficulties or covert Mossad and CIA operations but simply because Iran has no intention of building nuclear bombs. The reports of IAEA inspectors and other nuclear experts have acknowledged the fact that Iran has long achieved mastery over uranium enrichment. IAEA’s Iran safeguard reports also verify that Iran has enriched uranium more efficiently over time and that the average monthly output of its enriched uranium has been increasing despite reports of Iran’s centrifuges being contaminated with the Stuxnet malware.

Iran also demonstrated its technical capability and skill to enrich uranium to higher levels by producing a sample batch of 20- percent level enriched uranium on a short notice last year. This was carried out upon Western countries’ refusal to supply fuel for Tehran nuclear research reactor producing medical isotopes for cancer patients in return for the exchange of the bulk of Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile. IAEA reports have also verified that Iran has so far produced 40 kilograms of 20-percent level enriched uranium under the supervision of its inspectors. Despite its technical capability to enrich uranium to even a weapon-grade level, Iran has not gone beyond enriching uranium to a level suitable for use in nuclear power plants.

Iran also voluntarily offered to exchange most of its existing low-enriched uranium stockpile in return for fuel rods for its Tehran research reactor. This was purely a voluntary and confidence-building measure by Iran, as no international rules require Iran to give up its low-enriched uranium in return for purchasing ready fuel rods. Western officials did not even seem to wonder why a country that is allegedly bent on developing nuclear bombs soon would want to voluntarily give up most of its low-enriched uranium stockpile. Yet, Western governments did not seize on this opportunity to strike a deal with Iran and instead pushed ahead with another round of Security Council sanctions against it.

A direct consequence of the Western confrontational policy toward Iran was that Iran was forced to start producing its own 20-percent level enriched uranium, as required in the process of building fuel rods for Tehran research reactor. Had the Western governments not gone ahead with imposing tighter sanctions on Iran and had they accepted Iran’s offer, Iran would not have mastered enriching uranium to 20 percent level now. This serves as a reminder that further tough measures by Western governments against Iran is only likely to further strengthen Iran’s resolve and push it to become more self-sufficient in nuclear technology.

　　

The unwarranted suspicion that Iran is bent on developing nuclear bombs has complicated the resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue and is likely to lead concerned parties on more dangerous paths in the future. Covert operations allegedly undertaken by western and Israeli intelligence agencies in the form of creating and spreading computer malwares and sponsoring terrorist attacks against Iranian nuclear scientists with a view to disrupting Iran’s nuclear program are extremely risky adventures which may entail grave consequences for the settlement of Iran’s nuclear issue. Iran’s fingers are already pointed at Israel, the U.S. and Britain for the assassination of its nuclear scientists. To say the least, Iranian response to these overt and covert acts of hostility against its nuclear program will not be positive.

While killing the chances of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, the covert Israeli and Western operations against Iran’s nuclear program are also not likely to achieve their intended goal of disrupting Iran’s nuclear program. The main reason for this observation is that nuclear experts closely monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities do not share the exaggerated view of the Israeli and Western politicians and media of the extent of damage caused to Iran’s enrichment facilities by the Stuxnet computer worm. A technical report issued on December 22, 2010 by a team of nuclear experts at the Institute for Science and International Security on the impact of Stuxnet computer worm on Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities concludes that Stuxnet may have succeeded in disrupting a limited number of Iranian centrifuges temporarily but if the goal of Stuxnet was to quickly destroy all the centrifuges at Natanz enrichment center it failed. IAEA reports also indicate that the monthly low-enriched uranium output at Natanz flattened but never came to a halt from mid 2008 to late 2009 and that it has substantially increased ever since.

To say the least, these acts of covert sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program are inimical to the very spirit of diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving Iran’s nuclear issue. They are likely to further strengthen Iranian resolve in pursuing its uranium enrichment program and create more domestic public support for Iran’s nuclear program. Not to mention various retaliation options available to Iran, these acts of hostility toward Iran are also likely to force Iran to limit its cooperation with the IAEA in order to minimize harm to its nuclear program . Taking these consequences and realities into account, there should be no reason for celebration by all concerned.

Elite and public perception in Turkey and Arab countries towards Iran

A recent public opinion survey of Turkish citizens has found that Turks consider not Iran but the U.S., followed by Israel, as their major national security threat. Joe Parkinson, a Wall Street Journal reporter, writes, “According to a wide-ranging survey carried out by the Ankara-based MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research Center in December, some 43% of Turks said they perceive the U.S. as the country’s biggest threat, followed by Israel, with 24%. Just 3% of those surveyed considered Iran a major threat”.

Given the absence of any military conflict between Iran and Turkey in the modern history and the relatively autonomous foreign policy orientation of Turkey under prime minister Erdogan, it should not come as a surprise that both Turkish citizens and political elites do not consider Iran as a security threat. These survey results also indicate that the relentless demonization of Iran by Western politicians and media and their characterization of Iran’s nuclear program as a serious threat to regional security have had no considerable impact on the attitude of Turkish citizens toward Iran. Turkey is a case in point in the region where the threat perception of its elites and its public largely converge. The release of these survey results also follow the decision of the Turkish government early last year to remove Iran from the list of countries that pose potential security concern to Turkey.

The relationship between elite and public threat perception in Turkey stands in sharp contrast to that in most Arab countries in the region. The threat perception of political elites in most Arab countries drastically diverges from that of their publics. While autocratic Arab rulers, as WikiLeaks-revealed documents indicate, hold a lop-sided perception of their national security threat and privately lobby the U.S. government for military action against Iran’s nuclear program, Arab masses hold diametrically opposite view of Iran’s role in the region . According to recent public opinion surveys, the overwhelming majority of Arab masses in the region do not consider Iran’s nuclear program and even, hypothetically speaking, a nuclear-armed Iran a threat to their national security. Increased democratic accountability and autonomous foreign policy orientation on the part of Arab political elites is expected to produce the same type of relationship between elite and public threat perception in those countries that exists in Turkey today. To read the full report on the recent survey of Turkish citizens, click here .

Iranian attitude toward nuclear weapons

Chart by International Peace Institute

*This article is simultaneously featuring in Foreign Policy Journal, American Chronicle,  Middle East Online, Online Opinion and OpEdNews

The International Peace Institute has recently released the results of its public opinion survey of a large random sample of Iranians, which was conducted in early September 2010. Among a host of questions posed to Iranian respondents on various political and economic issues, one question particularly stands out in light of the current stand-off between Iran and the U.S. over its nuclear program as it gauges the level of public support in Iran for the development of nuclear weapons. In response to a question as to whether they support the development of nuclear weapons by their country, a remarkable 71 percent of Iranian respondents have said they favor such a scenario. What is particularly striking about this finding is that it shows a drastic hike over the previous poll, conducted in May 2009 by the same agency, in public support for the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. The previous three polls conducted since 2007 by the same agency had all found Iranians roughly split over their support for the development of nuclear weapons.

In light of the above, one may wonder whether such public opinion findings may entail any significance for Iran’s nuclear issue and whether it should be treated as an alarming sign that can influence policies on either side of the diplomatic front. While these findings may be used by some to raise the specter of a nuclear-armed Iran, it bears no notable policy significance for Iran. The main reason for this is that there are simply no avenues through which public opinion on this issue can translate into public pressure on the Iranian policy-makers and thus influence their policy preferences with regard to nuclear weapons. Upon national security considerations, Iranian media as well as politicians refrain from debating the possible development of nuclear weapons by Iran as a policy option lest it feeds into further international suspicion over Iran’s nuclear program. Given that opinions on sensitive national security issues such as hypothetical development of nuclear weapons find no form of public expression in Iran, it remains highly questionable whether they can be of any relevance to policy making.

In light of the above situation, Iranian elite preferences on nuclear weapons development remain independent of public attitude on this issue. The highest political elites in Iran have all stated their policy preference against the development of nuclear weapons repeatedly over the past several years. While they all share the same position in publicly disavowing the development of nuclear weapons as a policy option for Iran, they tend to frame their opposition to nuclear weapons development in different terms. Given his role also as a spiritual leader of the country, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei tends to frame his opposition to nuclear weapons development in religious and Islamic jurisprudence terms. At the initial peak of international controversy over Iran’s nuclear program several years ago, he issued a religious fatwa prohibiting the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons and has reiterated this stance a number of times ever since . Employing the Islamic notion of haram to characterize different policy issues of nuclear weapons added a religious weight to the political significance of his ruling. His explicit renunciation of all policy aspects of nuclear weapons, including its possession for deterrence purposes, put an end to the then nascent media debate that was broaching the idea that possessing nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes might be permissible under Islamic jurisprudence. While Khamenei is neither the sole nor the most prominent religious jurisprudent in Iran and while other Islamic jurisprudents may hold different opinions on the possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes from religious perspectives, his ruling on this issue carries political weight as it is sanctioned by the state.

In light contrast to Khamenei, President Ahmadinejad tends to frame his opinion on the development of nuclear weapons in rational national security terms. He renounces the allegation that Iran’s nuclear program is geared to building bombs by questioning the utility of nuclear weapons for national security purposes. He argues that Iran does not need nuclear weapons because they serve no purpose in today’s international system. He frequently refers to the fact that nuclear weapons did not prevent the collapse of the former Soviet Union from within nor have they brought peace and security to Israel. Ahmadinejad often deliberately eschews the religious language of haram to characterize nuclear weapons in part because he considers the language of rational national security calculations more understandable to his international audience.

Regardless of the type of framing that Iran’s political elites use to represent their attitude toward nuclear weapons, Iran’s interlocutors say they require more than an appropriate language to trust Iran’s intentions. The U.S government officials have repeatedly stated that they base their assessment of Iran’s intentions on its actions rather than its words. While this view appears fair and reasonable, there is no better alternative to relying on publicly stated positions and attitudes of Iran’s political elites to trust their intentions. Given the current level of Iran’s nuclear capacities, relying on objective facts to discern Iran’s intentions in developing nuclear fuel technology is not going to help solve the puzzle either. Nuclear activities short of enriching uranium to a weapon’s grade level and designing and building warheads with nuclear payload and detonators can not provide a decisive clue to whether Iran’s actions are aimed at ultimately developing nuclear weapons. It thus all remains a matter of conjecture and speculation as to whether Iran’s nuclear program may be diverted to military purposes in the future. It goes without saying that possible future intentions and capabilities do not constitute an infringement under international law.