Russian and Chinese positions on Iran's nuclear issue:INTERVIEW Part VIII

Kourosh Ziabari: Iran has invested a lot in its relationship with China and Russia and considers them its strategic allies; however, both of these countries showed green light to anti-Iranian sanctions in the Security Council and facilitated the imposition of resolutions against Iran in an undeniable complicity with the United States. In the other words, Russia and China flagrantly betrayed Iran in time of need. What do you think about Iran's relations with China and Russia? Why has Iran trusted them several times despite the fact that it was cleared to Tehran that they're not loyal friends?

Abolghasem Bayyenat: I would look at the situation somewhat differently. In international relations states are loyal only to their own interests. Realism is still the dominant discourse in international relations and states view their relations with each other largely in realist terms. National interests defined broadly in terms of maximizing their own military power and economic well-being vis-à-vis other states is the guiding principle of the foreign policy of states. Seasoned Iranian foreign policy makers also understand the limits of Iran's bargaining power with regard to China and Russia, when other states, particularly Western powers, are competing with it for their loyalty.

While both China and Russia have important stakes in their relations with Iran, they also maintain by far larger interests in their relations with the United States and other Western powers. China and the United States are economically highly interdependent and the U.S. market serves as the single most important destination for Chinese exports. Russia has similarly important economic and security interests in its relations with the West. Both countries have tried to strike a fine balance between their relations with Iran and the West in order to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. While their actions in betraying Iran's trust at some points may be morally and legally indefensible, it is not always possible for them to keep both parties to the conflict content and their interests may require that they sometimes lean toward one side at the expense of the other.

Both Russia and China have also significantly softened the language of the Security Council resolutions against Iran and have opposed certain harsh measures against it, a fact which shows that they still maintain important interests in their relations with Iran, which they are not willing to give up unless the West is prepared to pay the necessary price for that. This of course does not mean that Russia and China have no redlines in their foreign policies and are willing to prostitute out their loyalties to the highest bidder, but there are clear limits to the extent to which they can support their allies. The experience of Russian and Chinese inaction towards NATO strikes on Serbia and their no more than verbal opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq were enough to remind even the most optimistic Iranian policy makers that they cannot tie their hope to the support of these two countries under all circumstances.

Russia’s new policy shift on Iran’s nuclear issue

 

 *This article is simulatenously published in the Middle East Online and American Chronicle.

Russian officials have made a series of statements on Iran’s nuclear program over the past several weeks which highlight a significant shift in their balancing position between Iran and the West. The most recent statement to that end was made by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev last week at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In a statement countering the dominant conception of Iran’s nuclear program in the West, Medvedev remarked that there is no proof that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons . This statement came a few days after President Medvedev held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, discussing bilateral relations and Iran’s nuclear program and after Iran’s Vienna-based envoy to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, traveled to Moscow in mid January to hold talks with Russian policy-makers over Iran’s nuclear program.

As in the case of similar statements challenging the conventional view of the Western political elites toward Iran’s nuclear program, Medvedev’s recent statement unsurprisingly did not receive coverage by the mainstream Western media. The censorship of Medvedev’s recent statement by the mainstream Western media does not of course detract from the importance of Russia’s new position on Iran’s nuclear issue.

Medvedev’s recent statement on Iran’s nuclear issue is not the only evidence pointing to a shift in Russia’s balancing act between Iran and the West. Other lower Russian officials have also made similar statements with the same effect regarding Iran’s nuclear issue over the past several weeks. The recent warm-up in Russia-Iran relations follows a period of tensions between the two countries which emerged after Russia, under pressure from Israel and the Unites States, reneged on its commitment to deliver S-300 surface to air missile system to Iran and after it joined the Western powers in voting for another round of Security Council sanctions against Iran in June 2010 .

The recent shift in Russia’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear issue can be understood in the context of the changing international circumstances overseeing Iran’s nuclear issue. Since Iran’s nuclear activities turned into a full-blown international issue several years ago, Russia has played a double game in order to secure its national interests in relation to both Iran and the West . First, Russia has had to be cooperative with the Western powers at the UN Security Council in order to have a say in formulating international policies shaping political outcomes around the world and also to use its cooperation with the West as a bargaining tool to gain concessions from it in other issue areas, such as its relations with the NATO and economic cooperation with the Western countries. This would make particular sense for Russia’s interests as its non-cooperation with the Western powers would have induced them to bypass the Security Council and to seek alternative arrangements dealing with Iran‘s nuclear issue , which would exclude Russia. Second, Russia , at the same time, also had to appear supportive of Iran by watering down the tone of the sanctions resolutions in order to preserve its strategic relations with it.

　

In practice, however, walking a fine line between Iran and the West has not always played out safely for Russia as it has involved the constant risk of alienating one party to the benefit of the other. Indeed this turned out to be the case last June when President Ahmadinejad of Iran publicly expressed his frustration with Russia over its vote for the last Security Council resolution against Iran, even after it had significantly watered down the language of the resolution. Iran’s anger at Russia for its perceived betrayal was not confined to public statements by Iranian officials. Iran’s initial practical response to Russia’s shifting position on Iran’s nuclear issue as well as its refusal to deliver S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to it was to order all Russian commercial pilots working in Iran to leave . Even though, non-political reasons were mentioned for terminating the work contract of Russian pilots in Iran, the timing and the publicity surrounding this announcement could not fail to reveal Iran’s political motives.

Apart from concerns about further backlash against its economic interests in Iran and its eagerness to maintain its strategic ties with it, the recent shift in Russia’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program is also driven by the US unilateral approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue in recent months, including imposing further tough sanctions on Iran through bilateral arrangements with other countries. At a recent press conference held jointly with Turkish foreign minister, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, referred to unilateral sanctions against Iran as a spoiler and expressed hope that they would be lifted in the nuclear talks between Iran and the P-5+1 countries, which was held recently in Istanbul . Along the same lines, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also stated recently that sanctions against Iran are futile and that the only way to deal with Iran's nuclear issue is diplomacy.

Regardless of Russia’s principled opposition to crippling economic sanctions against Iran, it would particularly oppose any arrangements dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue to which Russia is not a part. As the US takes a more unilateral approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue, Russia will find itself more leaning toward Iran and is expected to work to undermine those additional punitive measures against Iran which are formulated outside the context of the UN Security Council.