The meaning of Rouhani’s electoral victory for Iran’s foreign policy

This article is simultaneously published in Foreign Policy In Focus and some other journals. 

The landslide victory of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and pro-reform cleric, in Iran’s recent presidential election came as a surprise to many observers within and outside of Iran.

Although Rouhani’s electoral victory was a major gain for the moderate and reformist political groups -and consequently a major loss for the conservative groups in Iran- its implications are  far greater than a mere adjustment in the balance of power in Iran’s domestic politics. Restoring public trust in Iran’s electoral system can be regarded as the most important byproduct of Rouhani’s electoral victory. While a sizable portion of Iran’s population had lost faith in the integrity and fairness of Iran’s electoral system and had become alienated after the disputed 2009 presidential elections, the electoral of victory of Rouhani in his race against several conservative government-favored presidential candidates without recourse to run-off elections helped restore public trust in the electoral system and promote national reconciliation and cohesion. Although the political competition in Iran is relatively constrained, the somewhat regular rotation of executive and parliamentary power between the reformist and conservative camps over the past two decades has provided the Iranian political system with a democratic face, thus boosting its political legitimacy in the eyes of most citizens.

This has in turn led to increased security for the Iranian political system.  The unprecedented 2009 post-election protests and the continued challenges posed by the so-called Green Movement to the conservative authorities in the following months and years had created an acute sense of vulnerability for the Iranian leaders, thus resulting in an unusually paranoid rule and a highly-politicized domestic climate over much of the last four years in Iran.  The healthy and undisputed nature of Iran’s recent presidential election, along with high voter turnout, have contributed to a greater sense of security for the Iranian political system. Increased regime security is expected to translate into improved political tolerance at home and increased self-confidence in external relations by the Iranian government.  

                     

Domestic political constraints facing Rouhani

While greater regime security translates into increased self-confidence in external relations, the direction of Iran’s foreign policy will be a function of the preferences of its current political elites acting within domestic and external constraints. Although Iran’s president elect is a moderate and pro-reform politician who has promised ‘constructive engagement’ with the outside world and a more rational and calculated foreign policy, as I have noted elsewhere, “given the fragmented nature of Iran’s political system and various checks and balances therein, no radical change is produced by a mere change of president, in Iran’s domestic politics as well as in its foreign policy”. It helps to recall that “even under the simultaneous control of the executive and the legislature by the reformists in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy were not radically transformed, even though some meaningful change was noticeable in some areas of foreign policy and domestic politics”.  However, “while the supreme leader has the final say on key foreign policy issues, the president may also influence those foreign policy decisions, due to his role as the elected representative of the national electorate. Generally speaking, a pragmatic or moderate president can to a certain degree moderate Iran’s foreign policy while an ultraconservative or revolutionary president can radicalize Iran’s foreign policy behavior”.

Will Rouhani be the second Khatami?

How successful Rouhani will be in exerting influence on Iran’s key foreign policy decisions as well as on issues of domestic politics remains to be seen. One tempting way to outline the prospects of Rouhani’s presidency in terms of both foreign policy and domestic politics is to compare it with the performance of former President Mohammad Khatami, whose surprise landslide victory in 1997 presidential election lead to the rise of the Iranian reform movement. While the two events are similar in some fundamental ways, they also differ in some important respects.  One of the main differences is that, having witnessed the political developments of the late 1990s and early 2000s in Iran, the Iranian conservative authorities have already gained practical experience in containing the power of reformist-controlled executive and legislative branches. This is why, unlike the landslide electoral victory of Khatami in 1997 which sent panic through the ranks of conservative political circles in Iran, the electoral victory of Rouhani has not created any noticeable fears among the conservatives. After all, Rouhani’s rise to executive power is not viewed as threatening to the foundations of the Islamic political system. In light of the above and given Rouhani’s centrist position and his trusted relationship with Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Rouhani is expected to face less resistance from conservative circles in realizing his electoral promises. This would stand in sharp contrast to Khatami’s tenure which was punctuated by numerous domestic political crises.  

       

The second major difference is that Khatami predominantly ran his electoral campaign on the promises of creating a better environment for civil and political liberties at home and normalizing Iran’s foreign relations in 1997. Running against the backdrop of Rafsanjani’s two-term presidency, which was primarily devoted to promoting economic development and reconstruction, Khatami’s narrative was less prominent in his vision of a more efficient economic management. Khatami, instead, emphasized that political development should be pursued in tandem with economic development, thus achieving a balanced development. Unlike Khatami, Rouhani ran his electoral campaign both on the promises of a sound and more efficient economic management and a wiser and more ‘constructive engagement’ with the outside world. Meanwhile, he also advocated a more relaxed social and political environment at home. This difference is another reason why Rouhani is expected to face less challenges from conservative circles as compared to Khatami in realizing his plans, as a lot of his electoral promises are shared with his conservative rivals. 

             

Dealing with economic problems as first priority   

The special domestic and international circumstances facing Iran today have defined different priorities for the Iranian leadership today than in the late 1990s. This explains why Rouhani, like most of his conservative rivals, highlighted his plans for addressing the dire economic situation at home through a more efficient economic management and better relations with the outside world. It also explains why most presidential candidates were critical of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy including his handling of the nuclear issue and attacked Saeed Jalili’s role (another conservative government-favored presidential candidate) as the chief nuclear negotiator under Ahamadinejad for being incompetent and unproductive.

The electoral victory of Rouhani thus reflects the public perception that he will be better poised than his conservative rivals to address those immediate needs. Perhaps no words better capture this sentiment than the opening lines of an editorial by a Persian-language Iranian news website, affiliated with the former Revolutionary Guards commander and a losing independent-leaning presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaee. Published right after Iran’s election results were announced, the editorial read “The defeat of the Principlists (conservatives) was necessary, even more so than daily bread! The Principlists should understand that they cannot be inefficient and at the same time expect the people to once again embrace them in droves”. The editorial reached its punch line by noting that “The people said ‘no’ to the Principlists because they cherish life and wished to send a new greeting to life. The Principlists should understand that people desire a better life more than anything else”. 

Rouhani’s electoral victory and the general consensus among the Iranian political elites today on the need to address Iran’s economic problems as the first priority and to pursue a more calculated and rational foreign policy, however, should not be understood to mean that Iran is willing to  suspend its core uranium enrichment activities. What it signifies however is that Iran is more determined now to address Western concerns about its nuclear activities and to build further international trust in its nuclear program in return for lifting Western economic sanctions and recognizing its peaceful nuclear activities. As Rouhani stated in his post-election press conference, there are a variety of mutual confidence-building measures, short of suspending nuclear enrichment activities, that Iran is willing to engage in to help build further international trust in its nuclear program, provided that Western powers are committed to genuine reciprocity vis-à-vis Iran. While Iran’s new elected president has declared to be open to ‘constructive engagement’ with Western powers over Iran’s nuclear issue, the Iranian leadership  is expected to be realistic as before in its expectations of Western powers to respond in kind to its new overtures. This is why the main pillar of Iran’s multi-pronged strategy in its current standoff with the West over its nuclear issue is expected to be continued national resistance through immunizing its economy to Western economic pressures by taking a variety of economic measures to reduce dependency on oil revenues, foster economic growth and curtail unnecessary imports.     

Iran's upcoming presidential election and the future course of its nuclear issue

Iranians are going to the polls to elect a new president on Friday, June 14^th. Many wonder whether and how Iran’s upcoming presidential election will affect its foreign policy, mainly the future course of its nuclear issue, as well as its domestic politics,. The following interview with Abolghasem Bayyenat, an independent political analyst covering Iran’s foreign policy developments ,conducted for El Mercurio newspaper,  sheds lights on these questions.       

Jean Palou; Why is the upcoming Iranian presidential election so important? If Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the authority who takes the key decisions in the country, what is the significance of the President?

Abolghasem Bayyenat; Iran is a major actor in a volatile region of the world, that is capable of influencing regional developments. Any change in the top leadership of Iran thus draws interest and attention from regional countries and beyond.  The special domestic economic and political circumstances as well as the precarious regional political conditions facing the Iranian leadership today all add to the importance of Iran’s upcoming presidential election for both Iranian citizens and interested foreign observes.

Who controls the executive in Iran has an important bearing on the balance of power between various political forces in the country. The president controls substantial resources and is in charge of managing the national economy and implementing foreign policy, among others. While the supreme leader has the final say on key foreign policy issues, the president may also influence those foreign policy decisions, due to his role as the elected representative of the national electorate. Generally speaking, a pragmatic or moderate president can to a certain degree moderate Iran’s foreign policy while an ultraconservative or revolutionary president can radicalize Iran’s foreign policy behavior.

Jean Palou; Does it matter that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not represented in this election? What will happen to Ahmadinejad after the election, given that his candidate, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, has been disqualified, and he has challenged in some way the authority of Khamenei?

Abolghasem Bayyenat; Ahmadinejad has lost much of his popularity over the last two years because of the economic crisis plaguing the country, including rampant inflation and sharp currency depreciation, caused in part by his economic mismanagement and Western economic sanctions. Due to his dismal economic legacy and his falling out of favor with Khamenei and his supporters over other issues, it has become too costly for presidential candidates to associate themselves with Ahmadinejad. Most of presidential candidates have, to varying degrees, distanced themselves from much of Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and his confrontational rhetoric in foreign policy. Although Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s close aide, has been barred from running in the upcoming presidential election, there is at least one main figure among the existing presidential candidates who largely embraces Ahmadinejad’s main foreign policy posture, built largely on fierce resistance against imperial powers. Ahmadinejad is expected to retire from politics for now and gradually fall into oblivion along with much of his economic legacy when his current tenure comes to an end in the next few months. However, it is possible, though not very probable, that he will try to make a comeback to politics by running in the next parliamentary or presidential elections after he has met the constitutional term limits by staying out of presidential race for one term. 

   

Jean Palou; What happened to the Green movement? Is a similar movement thinkable this time?

Abolghasem Bayyenat; The Green Movement has lost much of its relevance and has become detached from its popular base in light of new political realities in Iran. It no longer represents a potent social or political force as it once used to do in its heyday and can best be viewed as being associated with some Iranian expatriate intellectual circles. The setup of the current presidential race is not expected to reproduce the conditions leading to the rise of the Green Movement in 2009. Great care has been taken to prevent the polarization of the political atmosphere along reformist and conservative lines in this election season. The presidential race is fought as much among conservative politicians themselves as it is fought between the reformist and conservative presidential candidates. The most immediate priority of the public is rescuing the economy and restoring stability and predictability to the economic environment rather than indulging on ideological rhetoric. As such, there is little room for mobilizing the masses on the scale of the 2009 presidential elections as most of the presidential candidates concur on the more efficient management of the economy and a wiser interaction with the outside world with a view to avoiding unwarranted costs for Iran’s national interests . What divide the presidential candidates are largely their different views of the constituent elements of a sound economic strategy and appropriate tactics regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, rather than diametrically opposed conceptions of public goals and national interests capable of polarizing the Iranian society.

Jean Palou; Considering the eight candidates in the race, could we expect a change in Iran’s politics? Or will be the same?

Abolghasem Bayyenat; In light of the above, and given the fragmented nature of Iran’s political system and various checks and balances therein, including direct and indirect oversight by the supreme leader over the entire political system, which all work to limit the power of the president and other elected political institutions, no radical change is expected to be brought about, by a change of president, in Iran’s domestic politics as well as in its foreign policy. Even under the simultaneous control of the executive and the legislature by the reformists in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy were not radically transformed, even though some meaningful change was noticeable in some areas of foreign policy and domestic politics. However, given the economic and political realities in Iran today as well as the beliefs of the presidential candidates, the victory of nearly any presidential candidate, whether reformist or conservative, in the upcoming election is expected to result in some level of moderation, even if only in tone, in Iran’s foreign policy and a more rational and conventional management of Iran’s economy, thus representing a shift from Ahmadinejad’s revolutionary-style foreign policy and unconventional and populist economic policies.  While there is a general consensus among Iranian political elites on Iran’s core position on its nuclear issue, whether a reformist or a conservative candidate is elected as Iran’s next president may also have a significant bearing on how Iran’s current standoff with the West over its nuclear issue will evolve over the next four years and beyond.

Jean Palou; What is your opinion of Saeed Jalili, who seems to be the leading candidate in the elections? Is he a hard liner politician?

Abolghasem Bayyenat; Saeed Jalili was little known in Iran before being thrown into the spotlight following his appointment as secretary of Iran’s supreme national security council by president Ahmadinejad and as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, virtually by default . He has not been involved in any partisan politics and has held no ministerial-level executive position in the past, a fact which works both as an advantage and a disadvantage for him in this election. Largely due to his unyielding stance on Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the West, Jalili has gained, among some religious and political circles in Iran, the reputation of an authentic revolutionary official, and as such as more in harmony with Khamenei. He is viewed to best represent the ideals of the Islamic revolution in foreign policy, founded mainly on resistance against Western colonial powers and defending the Islamic ummah and oppressed nations. If elected as president, Jalili is expected to continue Iran’s existing foreign policy, albeit perhaps with a less controversial style, while enhancing domestic capacities for a self-reliant economy, capable of sustaining his favored foreign policy. Among the existing presidential candidates, Jalili can thus be regarded as closest to Ahamdinejad’s ideological line, and if elected as president, his presidency can be viewed, by and large, as the second iteration of Ahamadinejad’s term, at least on foreign policy grounds.  

Jean Palou; What could the next Iranian President do to calm down the foreign pressure against Teheran?

Abolghasem Bayyenat; In order to reduce Western economic pressures, the next Iranian President can intensify the ongoing diplomatic engagement with Western powers to find a mutually-satisfactory solution to Iran’s nuclear issue. Iran could take a variety of confidence-building measures to build further trust in the exclusively-peaceful nature of its nuclear issue. This could work if Western powers were ready to recognize Iran’s rights under the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and accept its core uranium enrichment activities while taking reciprocal measures to relieve their economic sanctions against Iran. In parallel, Iran could also build mutual trust with major Arab countries in the region by expanding its economic and political ties with them and mitigating their security concerns about its nuclear capabilities and regional intentions. 

But no amount of cooperation and flexibility by Iran is guaranteed to secure a diplomatic agreement with a party already bent on pursuing a confrontational path through intensifying economic sanctions and issuing military threats against Iran. This is why the next Iranian president would have to adopt various measures to further immunize his country to Western economic pressures. Undertaking ambitious economic reforms to foster economic growth and stability, reduce dependence on oil revenues, curtail unnecessary imports, and encourage domestic production are necessary steps to minimize vulnerabilities to Western economic pressures and to protect Iran’s much-valued national honor and political independence.                                 

* Jean Palou is a journalist for El Mercurio newspaper in Santiago, Chile.

Humbled Iranian president faces tough final years

Written by: Brian Murphy; Associated Press

Source: ABC News

Weeks of political storms in Iran came down to this moment. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could choose to deepen his dispute with the country's top ruler. Or here was a chance to make amends and lift Iran out of an ugly power struggle.He ended up doing a bit of both.

At a Cabinet meeting Sunday, Ahmadinejad lavishly praised Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But he added some jabs at those who sided with Khamenei in the showdown — which began over Iran's spy chief but quickly expanded into a test of wills between the political machine of the presidency and the towering authority of the theocracy.

Ahmadinejad's half-step contrition could say much about the tone of his final two years in office: humbled and diminished to some degree, but showing no intention of drifting quietly into a lame duck exit.The main message, experts say, is that Ahmadinejad has lost his favored-son status among the ruling clerics, and now Khamenei and the hard-line theocrats are reasserting their grip with parliament elections next year and the vote for Ahmadinejad's successor in mid-2013. This all means Ahmadinejad may be increasingly sidelined in shaping important policies — including the nuclear standoff with the West — and grooming a political heir.

Instead, the ruling system will likely try to keep Ahmadinejad and his allies boxed in politically and offer little change in Iran's defiant approach to the West and its Gulf neighbors. At home, meanwhile, the clerics may apply even more pressure on Iran's fractured opposition to keep it in line as the rest of the region is awash in pro-reform struggles, analysts say.

"What we're seeing is the ruling system showing its strength and Ahmadinejad displaying his weaknesses," said Mehrzad Boroujerdi, who follows Iranian affairs at Syracuse University. "That's not to say he won't still score some victories. But his time is already fading."It was inevitable that attention would shift to the race to succeed Ahmadinejad as he has maxed out his time with two consecutive terms. Ahmadinejad, however, dramatically sped up the look-ahead process with a political gambit that backfired.It started last month when he apparently forced the resignation of the influential Intelligence Minister Haidar Moslehi.

　

Some Iranian media speculated it was part of Ahmadinejad's efforts to boost a possible presidential run by his close friend and chief aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Control of the Interior Ministry is considered an important tool in Iranian politics because its sensitive files have the potential to discredit rivals.

But Supreme Leader Khamenei tossed it all back, reinstating Moslehi and prompting a 10-day disappearing act by Ahmadinejad, who stayed away from Cabinet meetings and other duties.The no-shows were interpreted as his most audacious challenge to Khamenei, the pinnacle of the Islamic leadership. Clerics, lawmakers and others warned Ahmadinejad to back down and return to work — which he did last week, but at a clear price.Now, the once ultra-confident Ahmadinejad appears off balance. The ruling clerics — which vet all candidates for high office — have effectively killed any chance of Mashaei running for president as Ahmadinejad's protege.

Meanwhile, critics in Iran's parliament sense Ahmadinejad is more vulnerable and have started another petition that could — in the most extreme scenario — lead to impeachment proceedings. The chants at Friday prayers, too, have included obvious slaps at Ahmadinejad. "Death to opponents of the supreme leader," the crowd roared at Tehran University last week.Even Ahmadinejad's longtime supporters, the hugely powerful Revolutionary Guard, signaled that he went too far. Ahmadinejad got the message: stop messing with the very foundations of the Islamic system. He pulled back before he dug himself any deeper.

"There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad's power has been undermined," said Abolghasem Bayyenat, a political analyst on Iranian affairs.But Bayyenat and others caution that all sides in Iran's leadership are highly unlikely to escalate the disputes.The supreme leader is likely worried about any hints of disarray in Iran at a time of major upheavals in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad knows he cannot win an open feud with the guardians of the Islamic Revolution and must be content with smaller steps on his main objectives: trying to further expand the independence and powers of the presidency and secure his legacy by having an ally elected in 2013.

"Khamenei is extremely sensitive to giving any public impression of serious divisions among the top political leaders of the country and would thus like to keep a tap on the political situation," said Bayyenat, who runs the website irandiplomacywatch.com. "While showing his respect for Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is also unlikely to buckle down under political pressure to dismiss ... Mashaei."

Mashaei is a hot button on both sides. He is despised by hard-liners for his views that elevate the values of pre-Islamic Persia and statements suggesting Iran can oppose Israel's government but can be friendly with the Israeli people. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, is fully vested in Mashaei as a member of his inner circle. Mashaei's daughter is also married to Ahmadinejad's son.

Suzanne Maloney, an Iranian affairs expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said there was no doubt about the outcome of the political stare-down in Iran."It didn't tell us anything we didn't know — that Khamenei is the top authority," she said.But the context is crucial. It's now about the jockeying for who will succeed Ahmadinejad.

Opposition groups claim that the Revolutionary Guard pulled the strings during the 2009 re-election of Ahmadinejad, which protesters allege was rigged. The Guard also led the fierce crackdown on demonstrators after the vote and have gradually expanded their power under Ahmadinejad.The Guard, however, has now made it clear that it will not back Ahmadinejad's ally Mashaei and may further distance themselves from Ahmadinejad as damaged goods during his last two years in office."The Revolutionary Guard is interested in the defense of the system rather than the defense of an individual," said Maloney. "It would never sacrifice itself or its influence to stand by anyone seen as challenging the system. Ahmadinejad has cast himself in that role."

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