Main features of latest IAEA report on Iran

Yesterday , the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its latest periodic report on Iran’s nuclear activities. The IAEA report contains the latest findings on the status of Iran’s compliance with IAEA regulations obtained through various verification techniques employed by its inspectors and nuclear analysts. As usual, the IAEA report presents both a factual account of latest developments concerning Iran’s nuclear activities as well as an interpretation of the status of Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the IAEA.

Here are the main features of the latest IAEA report on Iran.

1. Despite mainstream Western media accounts of Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities being seriously hampered by various covert US and Israeli sabotage operations, the IAEA report shows that Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities have continued unabated. The following is a more detailed account of this.

-Even though the total number of installed centrifuges at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) stands the same as in the previous report (-February 2011), the IAEA report shows that Iran has added 676 more centrifuges to those operating. This brings the total number of operating centrifuges to 5860, albeit, according to the IAEA report, not all the operating centrifuges may be fed with uranium gas UF6 .

-The IAEA report shows that since the last reporting period, Iran has produced 499 kg more low-enriched uranium (LEU), thus registering an increase of 28 kg LEU production over the last period, a fact which may be attributed to the increased number of operating centrifuges. Iran is thus now in possession of a total of 4105 kg LEU.

- The IAEA report also shows that Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium to 20% level in two of its centrifuge cascades at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP, annexed to FEP) continue uninterruptedly. Over the latest reporting period, Iran has produced another 13.7 kg 20%-level LEU thus adding its total stock to 56.7 kg by the end of the current reporting period.

　

2. According to the IAEA report, all Iran’s {declared} nuclear facilities operate in accordance with the IAEA safeguards rules and there has been no diversion form their stated peaceful goals. As in the previous reports, the latest IAEA report recognizes that “The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance” and that “Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February 2007 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran”.

　

3. The IAEA report continues to level the same allegations against Iran about the possible existence of undeclared nuclear activities in that country and calls on the Iranian government to cooperate with the Agency to clarify those suspicions. The report lists examples of a number of suspected illegal activities that Iran may have been involved with in the past or at present but presents no evidence to substantiate those allegations.

4. Al in all, apart from providing an update on the progress of Iran’s nuclear activities and verifying the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities over the past three months, the IAEA reports does not present any new information or observation on the status of Iran’s compliance with the IAEA Safeguards rules.

The IAEA report concludes by making the same tired observation that “While the Agency continues to conduct verification activities under Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, Iran is not implementing a number of its obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; suspension of heavy water related activities; and clarification of the remaining outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme” and that “ as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities”. Iran considers these additional demands enumerated in the IAEA report, which have been imposed by the Security Council resolutions, as unlawful and categorically rejects the allegations leveled against it about the possible existence of undeclared nuclear activities in its territory.

Prospects of further nuclear talks with Iran

*This article is simultaneously published in Foreign policy Journal, Middle East Online and American Chronicle.

The contents of the recent letter of Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to his European interlocutor and EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton have turned out to be far from exciting to her. Last week, a spokeswoman spelled out Ashton’s position on Jalili’s letter by saying that “On its own, Mr. Jalili's letter does not contain anything new and does not seem to justify a further meeting,". In a recent press conference with the US secretary of state Hillary Clinton in Washignton, DC, Ashton also expressed her own sentiments on Jalili’s letter by noting that “I had wished for a stronger and better letter from them to recognize that the offer on the table is an offer they should look at very carefully,".

The source of disappointment for Ashton and her American counterpart is the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the level of their expectations and the reality of Iran’s position on its nuclear issue. Official statements indicate that Ashton had expected Iran to give an advance hint, if not an explicit recognition, that it is willing to meet the Western powers’ negotiating demands for positively considering the suspension of its uranium enrichment program and discussing other related issues, including a nuclear fuel swap deal, in return for a package of so-called ‘incentives’.

In the first round of talks held in Istanbul last January, the Iranian chief negotiator had made it clear to his European counterpart that the suspension of nuclear enrichment program was a non-starter for the negotiations as it would contravene Iran’s explicit rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While declaring Iran’s readiness to discuss various issues of common interest in an upcoming meeting with the P-5+1 representatives, Jalili has reportedly reiterated Iran’s earlier position that the talks need to be conducted within the framework of international law and on “common grounds” , a recognizable code phrase for the non-negotiability of the suspension of nuclear enrichment activities by Iran. This position has been reaffirmed by the highest political authorities in Iran in recent days.

Despite Iran’s officially declared interest in continued negotiations on issues of common interest, Western officials have interpreted Jalili’s recent communication as a refusal to enter into further negotiations on Western terms. It was along these lines that Ashton stated that “ I do urge Iran to think again and to consider coming back to the table" and her American counterpart reprimanded Iran for what she considered to be “stalling tactics” and “unacceptable preconditions”.

Given this situation, Ashton has indicated that they need to wait until they receive a more positive signal from Tehran to resume the negotiations. Perhaps she hopes that over time Iran will feel the heat of strengthened sanctions and will be compelled to come to the negotiating table under Western terms. It is in line with this logic that the European Union officials announced in recent days that they have expanded the scope of their economic sanctions against Iran to target more Iranian companies.

However, the reality is that increased sanctions over the past year have only had the effect of further strengthening Iran’s resolve to safeguard what it considers to be its obvious nuclear rights. The wide range of precautionary economic countermeasures successfully adopted and implemented by Iran over the past several years to minimize the scope of damage caused by sanctions has also provided further confidence to Iranian leaders that they can well withstand new Western economic pressures.

Western hopes that Iran would signal its willingness to abide by its terms to negotiate the suspension of its nuclear enrichment activities, while the new economic sanctions are in place and are even expanded, have not yet seen the light of day. Regardless of whether or not Western officials have tied their hopes to this, there are no clues that Iran might be moving toward that direction because of changes in its domestic and regional political environment either .

Recent internal political developments have not had any impact on Iran’s position on its nuclear issue in the manner that Western powers would have wished to see. In fact , quite to the contrary. Ahmadinejad is expected to maintain the same position, if not a more hard-line one, on the nuclear issue in order to bolster his own political position at home. The last thing Ahmadinejad would need under current political circumstances in Iran is further antagonizing his conservative political opponents by giving any impression of leniency towards Western powers on the nuclear issue.

Normally internal political divisions among Iranian political elites might have encouraged more leniency on the nuclear issue had the opposing political factions to Ahmadinejd had a more conciliatory position toward the West on Iran’s nuclear issue. But the reality is that possessing nuclear fuel cycle technology has become so much entrenched in the Iranian national psyche that any indication of crossing this redline by any political group would be tantamount to the end of its political life. Though speaking in a different tone and employing different tactics on the nuclear issue, even the reformist political opposition groups would be expected to adhere to the same strategies in the unlikely event of capturing political power.

All this does not mean to make the point that there is no hope for further talks with Iran. Rather than focusing on self-defeating preconditions that Iran should indicate its willingness to accept Western proposals even before negotiations are held, Western powers should seize the opportunity to negotiate mutual confidence-building measures with Iran , including nuclear fuel swap deal, in return for offering to lift the additional sanctions that have been imposed on Iran over the past year. As the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated last January in Istanbul, the talks need to cover not only Iran's nuclear program but also "the prospect of dropping sanctions as Iran begins to cooperate with the IAEA more effectively”. The existing Western strategy to impose more unilateral economic sanctions on Iran are not only unlikely to produce any tangible results but are also likely to drive a wedge among the P-5+1 countries, some of which have different interests in the way international policies are formulated with regard to Iran, thus further undermining its effectiveness.

Nature of recent political dispute between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad

Picture shows Ahmadinejad  kissing Ayatollah Khamenei's hand at the swearing-in ceremony for his first term 

The recent intervention by Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei to veto President Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of his intelligence minister and his subsequent lukewarm reaction to Khamenei’s intervention have given rise to a variety of analyses and speculations about the causes of this incident and its implications for Iran’s domestic politics as well as its foreign policy in the months and years to come. Some analysts have gone as far as interpreting the recent developments as a full-scale power struggle between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad and alarming the West of the ominous implications of a possible victory of Ahmadinejad over Khamenei. Such analyses clearly do not reflect an in-depth understanding of the nature of the political system and domestic politics in post-revolutionary Iran.

The recent political developments in Iran are obviously not devoid of any political significance. Indeed, by his recent intervention to veto Ahmadinejad’s decision to sack his intelligence minister Khamenei scored several points. First, his act had the effect of further consolidating his own position as the ultimate power and a supra-constitutional figure in Iran. Second, even if not originally intended, his measure was also viewed as an appeasement and a conciliatory signal to the political opponents of Ahmadinejad including the former president Rafsanjani, moderate reformist political figures as well as Ahmadinejad’s conservative critics in the Iranian parliament, many of whom were disenchanted with Khamenei’s strong support for Ahmadinejad in the last disputed presidential election in Iran. Third, Khamenei also demonstrated to the public that he does not reserve an unconditional and perpetual support for Ahmadinejad. Such a public gesture makes it more convenient for Khamenei to disavow Ahmadinejad in the future in the event public and elite opposition to Ahmadinejad threatens the very foundations of the political system in Iran.

There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad’s power has been undermined. His recent statement in the cabinet meting that a strong president bolsters the position of the supreme leader was an implicit admission to the fact that the recent developments have undermined his position. Notwithstanding this, Ahmadinejad is not expected to openly challenge the person of the supreme leader on both ideological and pragmatic grounds. On the pragmatic ground, he is well aware that any overt challenge to the person of the supreme leader would amount to political suicide for him. Some members of the Iranian parliament have already threatened Ahmadinejad with impeachment should he not show humble respect for Khamenei’s recent intervention. Ahmadinejad knows well that upon Khamenei’s green light , his opponents at the parliament can well muster enough votes to effectively impeach him. Presidential impeachment has a precedent in the history of the Islamic republic, a fact which makes such a threat more credible.

In addition to pragmatic considerations, Ahmadinejad is also averse to openly challenging the person of the supreme leader for ideological reasons. He holds deep respect for the person of the supreme leader and is in principle against disputing his position. However this does not mean to preclude the possibility of a passive-aggressive reaction by Ahmadinejad, as in the recent case, to show his discontent at any infringement upon his constitutional powers. Rather than directly challenging Khamenei, he is likely to publicly challenge those conservative political circles which capitalized on the recent occasion to undermine his power, should they persist in their political offensive.

All in all, caution should be taken not to read too much into the recent political dispute in Iran . While some conservative political circles would like to exploit the existing political situation in order to score more political points against Ahmadinejad, such as by pressuring him to sack his controversial aide Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, both Khamenei and Ahmadinejad would prefer to prevent any further political wrangling in the country. For clear reasons, Khamenei is extremely sensitive to giving any public impression of serious divisions among the top political leaders of the country and would thus like to keep a tap on the political situation. While showing his respect for Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is also unlikely to buckle down under political pressure to dismiss his close aide and chief of staff Mashaei. In the past, Ahmadinejad has shown his resilience in the face of political pressures when important issues for him were at stake . While respecting Khamenei’s instruction not to appoint Mashaei as vice-president in a similar intervention at the opening of his second presidential term, Ahmadinejad also demonstrated his independence by appointing Mashaei as his chief of staff instead. In light of these considerations, the current political situation in Iran is not expected to unravel much further and the political actors would most likely content with the existing gains distribution.

Humbled Iranian president faces tough final years

Written by: Brian Murphy; Associated Press

Source: ABC News

Weeks of political storms in Iran came down to this moment. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could choose to deepen his dispute with the country's top ruler. Or here was a chance to make amends and lift Iran out of an ugly power struggle.He ended up doing a bit of both.

At a Cabinet meeting Sunday, Ahmadinejad lavishly praised Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But he added some jabs at those who sided with Khamenei in the showdown — which began over Iran's spy chief but quickly expanded into a test of wills between the political machine of the presidency and the towering authority of the theocracy.

Ahmadinejad's half-step contrition could say much about the tone of his final two years in office: humbled and diminished to some degree, but showing no intention of drifting quietly into a lame duck exit.The main message, experts say, is that Ahmadinejad has lost his favored-son status among the ruling clerics, and now Khamenei and the hard-line theocrats are reasserting their grip with parliament elections next year and the vote for Ahmadinejad's successor in mid-2013. This all means Ahmadinejad may be increasingly sidelined in shaping important policies — including the nuclear standoff with the West — and grooming a political heir.

Instead, the ruling system will likely try to keep Ahmadinejad and his allies boxed in politically and offer little change in Iran's defiant approach to the West and its Gulf neighbors. At home, meanwhile, the clerics may apply even more pressure on Iran's fractured opposition to keep it in line as the rest of the region is awash in pro-reform struggles, analysts say.

"What we're seeing is the ruling system showing its strength and Ahmadinejad displaying his weaknesses," said Mehrzad Boroujerdi, who follows Iranian affairs at Syracuse University. "That's not to say he won't still score some victories. But his time is already fading."It was inevitable that attention would shift to the race to succeed Ahmadinejad as he has maxed out his time with two consecutive terms. Ahmadinejad, however, dramatically sped up the look-ahead process with a political gambit that backfired.It started last month when he apparently forced the resignation of the influential Intelligence Minister Haidar Moslehi.

　

Some Iranian media speculated it was part of Ahmadinejad's efforts to boost a possible presidential run by his close friend and chief aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Control of the Interior Ministry is considered an important tool in Iranian politics because its sensitive files have the potential to discredit rivals.

But Supreme Leader Khamenei tossed it all back, reinstating Moslehi and prompting a 10-day disappearing act by Ahmadinejad, who stayed away from Cabinet meetings and other duties.The no-shows were interpreted as his most audacious challenge to Khamenei, the pinnacle of the Islamic leadership. Clerics, lawmakers and others warned Ahmadinejad to back down and return to work — which he did last week, but at a clear price.Now, the once ultra-confident Ahmadinejad appears off balance. The ruling clerics — which vet all candidates for high office — have effectively killed any chance of Mashaei running for president as Ahmadinejad's protege.

Meanwhile, critics in Iran's parliament sense Ahmadinejad is more vulnerable and have started another petition that could — in the most extreme scenario — lead to impeachment proceedings. The chants at Friday prayers, too, have included obvious slaps at Ahmadinejad. "Death to opponents of the supreme leader," the crowd roared at Tehran University last week.Even Ahmadinejad's longtime supporters, the hugely powerful Revolutionary Guard, signaled that he went too far. Ahmadinejad got the message: stop messing with the very foundations of the Islamic system. He pulled back before he dug himself any deeper.

"There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad's power has been undermined," said Abolghasem Bayyenat, a political analyst on Iranian affairs.But Bayyenat and others caution that all sides in Iran's leadership are highly unlikely to escalate the disputes.The supreme leader is likely worried about any hints of disarray in Iran at a time of major upheavals in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad knows he cannot win an open feud with the guardians of the Islamic Revolution and must be content with smaller steps on his main objectives: trying to further expand the independence and powers of the presidency and secure his legacy by having an ally elected in 2013.

"Khamenei is extremely sensitive to giving any public impression of serious divisions among the top political leaders of the country and would thus like to keep a tap on the political situation," said Bayyenat, who runs the website irandiplomacywatch.com. "While showing his respect for Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is also unlikely to buckle down under political pressure to dismiss ... Mashaei."

Mashaei is a hot button on both sides. He is despised by hard-liners for his views that elevate the values of pre-Islamic Persia and statements suggesting Iran can oppose Israel's government but can be friendly with the Israeli people. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, is fully vested in Mashaei as a member of his inner circle. Mashaei's daughter is also married to Ahmadinejad's son.

Suzanne Maloney, an Iranian affairs expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said there was no doubt about the outcome of the political stare-down in Iran."It didn't tell us anything we didn't know — that Khamenei is the top authority," she said.But the context is crucial. It's now about the jockeying for who will succeed Ahmadinejad.

Opposition groups claim that the Revolutionary Guard pulled the strings during the 2009 re-election of Ahmadinejad, which protesters allege was rigged. The Guard also led the fierce crackdown on demonstrators after the vote and have gradually expanded their power under Ahmadinejad.The Guard, however, has now made it clear that it will not back Ahmadinejad's ally Mashaei and may further distance themselves from Ahmadinejad as damaged goods during his last two years in office."The Revolutionary Guard is interested in the defense of the system rather than the defense of an individual," said Maloney. "It would never sacrifice itself or its influence to stand by anyone seen as challenging the system. Ahmadinejad has cast himself in that role."

Disclaimer: www.IranDiplomacyWatch.com does not necessarily approve of views expressed by external authors in its reprinted pieces.

US sanctions and safety of air travel in Iran

Written by: Alan Dron

Source: Arabian Aerospace Online News

Affected by a generation of sanctions imposed by the United States that has prevented the sale of US airliners – and many European models – to Iran, its situation has been worsened in recent months by UN-mandated sanctions against Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. These have made it difficult for Iranian aircraft to refuel in several European nations.

The poor condition of the Iranian aviation industry is reflected in its accident rate. Over the past decade, Iran has suffered one of the world’s worst aviation records for crashes. Almost 20 military and civil transport aircraft have met with fatal accidents and the country’s civil air fleet is increasingly elderly and difficult to maintain.

It is a sad fall for a country whose national airline in the late 1970s was the world’s fastest-growing and was a customer for the Anglo-French supersonic Concorde. Indeed, the Iran Air offices in London’s Piccadilly still have a Concorde model in the company’s colours in the window, a poignant reminder of faded ambitions.

With its poor accident record – in autumn 2009 the Los Angeles Times cited an aircraft accident investigator who noted that 10 per cent of the entire global total of aircraft hull losses were Iranian – the country is increasingly mired in aviation problems. Much of the blame for this poor record is placed – particularly by the Iranian authorities – on a generation of US sanctions that has crippled sales of new aircraft and spares to the Islamic Republic.

Imposed after the fall of the Shah and the hostage-taking of US embassy personnel by the new Islamic government in 1979, they have been rigorously enforced by the US. Their effect has been felt not only by US airline manufacturers and spares companies, but also on non-US airframers whose aircraft contain more than 10 per cent US content by value. This effectively means that any aircraft powered by US-built engines cannot be sold to Iran.

This explains why Iran has become one of the last strongholds of the Dutch-built Fokker F100, whose Rolls-Royce Tay powerplants fall outside the terms of the embargo. Iran Air, for example, has a fleet of 16, while Iran Aseman Airlines has 20 and Iranian Air Transport, four. The Fokker 50 is popular for the same reason, but otherwise, Iranian airlines’ fleets tend to be composed of a heterogeneous mix of elderly, pre-sanction era Airbuses or Boeings.