Prospects of further nuclear talks with Iran

*This article is simultaneously published in Foreign policy Journal, Middle East Online and American Chronicle.

The contents of the recent letter of Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili to his European interlocutor and EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton have turned out to be far from exciting to her. Last week, a spokeswoman spelled out Ashton’s position on Jalili’s letter by saying that “On its own, Mr. Jalili's letter does not contain anything new and does not seem to justify a further meeting,". In a recent press conference with the US secretary of state Hillary Clinton in Washignton, DC, Ashton also expressed her own sentiments on Jalili’s letter by noting that “I had wished for a stronger and better letter from them to recognize that the offer on the table is an offer they should look at very carefully,".

The source of disappointment for Ashton and her American counterpart is the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the level of their expectations and the reality of Iran’s position on its nuclear issue. Official statements indicate that Ashton had expected Iran to give an advance hint, if not an explicit recognition, that it is willing to meet the Western powers’ negotiating demands for positively considering the suspension of its uranium enrichment program and discussing other related issues, including a nuclear fuel swap deal, in return for a package of so-called ‘incentives’.

In the first round of talks held in Istanbul last January, the Iranian chief negotiator had made it clear to his European counterpart that the suspension of nuclear enrichment program was a non-starter for the negotiations as it would contravene Iran’s explicit rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. While declaring Iran’s readiness to discuss various issues of common interest in an upcoming meeting with the P-5+1 representatives, Jalili has reportedly reiterated Iran’s earlier position that the talks need to be conducted within the framework of international law and on “common grounds” , a recognizable code phrase for the non-negotiability of the suspension of nuclear enrichment activities by Iran. This position has been reaffirmed by the highest political authorities in Iran in recent days.

Despite Iran’s officially declared interest in continued negotiations on issues of common interest, Western officials have interpreted Jalili’s recent communication as a refusal to enter into further negotiations on Western terms. It was along these lines that Ashton stated that “ I do urge Iran to think again and to consider coming back to the table" and her American counterpart reprimanded Iran for what she considered to be “stalling tactics” and “unacceptable preconditions”.

Given this situation, Ashton has indicated that they need to wait until they receive a more positive signal from Tehran to resume the negotiations. Perhaps she hopes that over time Iran will feel the heat of strengthened sanctions and will be compelled to come to the negotiating table under Western terms. It is in line with this logic that the European Union officials announced in recent days that they have expanded the scope of their economic sanctions against Iran to target more Iranian companies.

However, the reality is that increased sanctions over the past year have only had the effect of further strengthening Iran’s resolve to safeguard what it considers to be its obvious nuclear rights. The wide range of precautionary economic countermeasures successfully adopted and implemented by Iran over the past several years to minimize the scope of damage caused by sanctions has also provided further confidence to Iranian leaders that they can well withstand new Western economic pressures.

Western hopes that Iran would signal its willingness to abide by its terms to negotiate the suspension of its nuclear enrichment activities, while the new economic sanctions are in place and are even expanded, have not yet seen the light of day. Regardless of whether or not Western officials have tied their hopes to this, there are no clues that Iran might be moving toward that direction because of changes in its domestic and regional political environment either .

Recent internal political developments have not had any impact on Iran’s position on its nuclear issue in the manner that Western powers would have wished to see. In fact , quite to the contrary. Ahmadinejad is expected to maintain the same position, if not a more hard-line one, on the nuclear issue in order to bolster his own political position at home. The last thing Ahmadinejad would need under current political circumstances in Iran is further antagonizing his conservative political opponents by giving any impression of leniency towards Western powers on the nuclear issue.

Normally internal political divisions among Iranian political elites might have encouraged more leniency on the nuclear issue had the opposing political factions to Ahmadinejd had a more conciliatory position toward the West on Iran’s nuclear issue. But the reality is that possessing nuclear fuel cycle technology has become so much entrenched in the Iranian national psyche that any indication of crossing this redline by any political group would be tantamount to the end of its political life. Though speaking in a different tone and employing different tactics on the nuclear issue, even the reformist political opposition groups would be expected to adhere to the same strategies in the unlikely event of capturing political power.

All this does not mean to make the point that there is no hope for further talks with Iran. Rather than focusing on self-defeating preconditions that Iran should indicate its willingness to accept Western proposals even before negotiations are held, Western powers should seize the opportunity to negotiate mutual confidence-building measures with Iran , including nuclear fuel swap deal, in return for offering to lift the additional sanctions that have been imposed on Iran over the past year. As the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated last January in Istanbul, the talks need to cover not only Iran's nuclear program but also "the prospect of dropping sanctions as Iran begins to cooperate with the IAEA more effectively”. The existing Western strategy to impose more unilateral economic sanctions on Iran are not only unlikely to produce any tangible results but are also likely to drive a wedge among the P-5+1 countries, some of which have different interests in the way international policies are formulated with regard to Iran, thus further undermining its effectiveness.

Humbled Iranian president faces tough final years

Written by: Brian Murphy; Associated Press

Source: ABC News

Weeks of political storms in Iran came down to this moment. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could choose to deepen his dispute with the country's top ruler. Or here was a chance to make amends and lift Iran out of an ugly power struggle.He ended up doing a bit of both.

At a Cabinet meeting Sunday, Ahmadinejad lavishly praised Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But he added some jabs at those who sided with Khamenei in the showdown — which began over Iran's spy chief but quickly expanded into a test of wills between the political machine of the presidency and the towering authority of the theocracy.

Ahmadinejad's half-step contrition could say much about the tone of his final two years in office: humbled and diminished to some degree, but showing no intention of drifting quietly into a lame duck exit.The main message, experts say, is that Ahmadinejad has lost his favored-son status among the ruling clerics, and now Khamenei and the hard-line theocrats are reasserting their grip with parliament elections next year and the vote for Ahmadinejad's successor in mid-2013. This all means Ahmadinejad may be increasingly sidelined in shaping important policies — including the nuclear standoff with the West — and grooming a political heir.

Instead, the ruling system will likely try to keep Ahmadinejad and his allies boxed in politically and offer little change in Iran's defiant approach to the West and its Gulf neighbors. At home, meanwhile, the clerics may apply even more pressure on Iran's fractured opposition to keep it in line as the rest of the region is awash in pro-reform struggles, analysts say.

"What we're seeing is the ruling system showing its strength and Ahmadinejad displaying his weaknesses," said Mehrzad Boroujerdi, who follows Iranian affairs at Syracuse University. "That's not to say he won't still score some victories. But his time is already fading."It was inevitable that attention would shift to the race to succeed Ahmadinejad as he has maxed out his time with two consecutive terms. Ahmadinejad, however, dramatically sped up the look-ahead process with a political gambit that backfired.It started last month when he apparently forced the resignation of the influential Intelligence Minister Haidar Moslehi.

　

Some Iranian media speculated it was part of Ahmadinejad's efforts to boost a possible presidential run by his close friend and chief aide, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Control of the Interior Ministry is considered an important tool in Iranian politics because its sensitive files have the potential to discredit rivals.

But Supreme Leader Khamenei tossed it all back, reinstating Moslehi and prompting a 10-day disappearing act by Ahmadinejad, who stayed away from Cabinet meetings and other duties.The no-shows were interpreted as his most audacious challenge to Khamenei, the pinnacle of the Islamic leadership. Clerics, lawmakers and others warned Ahmadinejad to back down and return to work — which he did last week, but at a clear price.Now, the once ultra-confident Ahmadinejad appears off balance. The ruling clerics — which vet all candidates for high office — have effectively killed any chance of Mashaei running for president as Ahmadinejad's protege.

Meanwhile, critics in Iran's parliament sense Ahmadinejad is more vulnerable and have started another petition that could — in the most extreme scenario — lead to impeachment proceedings. The chants at Friday prayers, too, have included obvious slaps at Ahmadinejad. "Death to opponents of the supreme leader," the crowd roared at Tehran University last week.Even Ahmadinejad's longtime supporters, the hugely powerful Revolutionary Guard, signaled that he went too far. Ahmadinejad got the message: stop messing with the very foundations of the Islamic system. He pulled back before he dug himself any deeper.

"There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad's power has been undermined," said Abolghasem Bayyenat, a political analyst on Iranian affairs.But Bayyenat and others caution that all sides in Iran's leadership are highly unlikely to escalate the disputes.The supreme leader is likely worried about any hints of disarray in Iran at a time of major upheavals in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad knows he cannot win an open feud with the guardians of the Islamic Revolution and must be content with smaller steps on his main objectives: trying to further expand the independence and powers of the presidency and secure his legacy by having an ally elected in 2013.

"Khamenei is extremely sensitive to giving any public impression of serious divisions among the top political leaders of the country and would thus like to keep a tap on the political situation," said Bayyenat, who runs the website irandiplomacywatch.com. "While showing his respect for Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is also unlikely to buckle down under political pressure to dismiss ... Mashaei."

Mashaei is a hot button on both sides. He is despised by hard-liners for his views that elevate the values of pre-Islamic Persia and statements suggesting Iran can oppose Israel's government but can be friendly with the Israeli people. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, is fully vested in Mashaei as a member of his inner circle. Mashaei's daughter is also married to Ahmadinejad's son.

Suzanne Maloney, an Iranian affairs expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said there was no doubt about the outcome of the political stare-down in Iran."It didn't tell us anything we didn't know — that Khamenei is the top authority," she said.But the context is crucial. It's now about the jockeying for who will succeed Ahmadinejad.

Opposition groups claim that the Revolutionary Guard pulled the strings during the 2009 re-election of Ahmadinejad, which protesters allege was rigged. The Guard also led the fierce crackdown on demonstrators after the vote and have gradually expanded their power under Ahmadinejad.The Guard, however, has now made it clear that it will not back Ahmadinejad's ally Mashaei and may further distance themselves from Ahmadinejad as damaged goods during his last two years in office."The Revolutionary Guard is interested in the defense of the system rather than the defense of an individual," said Maloney. "It would never sacrifice itself or its influence to stand by anyone seen as challenging the system. Ahmadinejad has cast himself in that role."

Disclaimer: www.IranDiplomacyWatch.com does not necessarily approve of views expressed by external authors in its reprinted pieces.

Iran-Pakistan relations in light of popular uprising in Bahrain

This article is simultaneously published in Foreign Policy Journal, American Chronicle and Online Opinion.

Pakistan’s interior minister Rehman Malik was recently on a visit to Tehran conveying a special message from the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to President Ahmadinejad of Iran. The Pakistani minister also met with other Iranian officials including his Iranian counterpart Mostafa Mohammad Najjar and the Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi. Besides the reports of routine diplomatic niceties over the importance of the bilateral relations of the two countries, no details have been reported on the content of the presidential message delivered by the Pakistani minister.

Lack of substantive media reports notwithstanding, there are some indications as to what may have motivated the Pakistani president to dispatch a special envoy to his Iranian counterpart and what issues may have topped the agenda of the meetings between the Pakistani minister and the Iranian officials. Over the past several years, security and economic cooperation have been the staples of the agendas of meetings between Iranian and Pakistani officials at various levels. However these issues are normally discussed in periodic meetings between the officials of the two countries and within structured frameworks governing the relations of the two countries, unless unpredicted situations arise in the relations of the two countries which would require immediate attention by both parties.

What gave urgency to the current situation in the relations of Iran and Pakistan was the ongoing popular uprising in Bahrain and the seemingly divergent positions of both countries toward the political crisis in that country. More specifically, Iran’s declared solidarity with the uprising of the Shiite majority in Bahrain and its strong opposition to any kind of military assistance provided by foreign governments to the Bahraini regime with a view to suppressing the public struggle for democracy in that country has meant that Pakistan had some explaining to do to Iranian officials in order to salvage its growing economic ties with Iran.

What touched Iran’s nerves was Pakistan’s recent decision to authorize the recruitment of thousands of its retired security officers by the Bahraini regime in an attempt to quell the public uprising there. Following this announcement, Iranian foreign ministry officials summoned the Pakistani charges d’affaires in Tehran and conveyed Iran’s strong reservations over Pakistan’s move and warned his government of serious diplomatic consequences if Pakistan followed through with its decision. The recent trip by the Pakistani interior minister to Tehran to deliver a special message from the Pakistani president to his Iranian counterpart can be understood as an effort to patch up political differences between the two countries over Bahrain and to prevent further diplomatic fallout between them.

The statements of the Pakistani embassy officials in Tehran over the political developments in the region in prelude to Malik’s trip to Tehran also indicate that Islamabad has meant to give assurances to Tehran that it does not intend to take sides in the political conflict in Bahrain. According to the Iranian media , the Pakistani charges d’ affaires in Tehran recently stated that "Pakistan's policy is maintaining neutrality and refraining from interference” in the ongoing political developments in the region including the political conflict in Bahrain. In a recent joint meeting, the Pakistani interior minister and the Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi also expressed their common view that the ongoing popular uprisings in the region are not of sectarian nature.

The degree of Pakistani concerns about Iran’s possible retributions over its position on Bahrain has been to the extent that some Pakistani media interpreted the recent announcement by the Iranian defense minister Ahmad Vahidi that Iran plans to build concrete security fence along its border with Pakistan to prevent border crossing by terrorists and drug traffickers as a response to Pakistan’s decision to deploy security personnel to Bahrain. Although building a security fence along its common border with Pakistan would make Iran less reliant on the not-always-forthcoming Pakistani security cooperation, such a strategic and long-term plan may clearly not have been motivated by short-term developments in the region. Nonetheless, border security arrangements were a major issue on the agenda of the Pakistani interior minister’s meeting with his Iranian counterpart. In this line, the Iranian interior minister Mostafa Najjar has reportedly called on the Pakistani government to step up efforts in disrupting the safe haven of the Jundallah terrorist group across the Iranian border in Pakistan.

In the past, Pakistan has extended limited cooperation to Iran by arresting and extraditing some wanted Jundallah terrorist members in its territory but it has been only a matter of time before Jundallah terrorists have regrouped and renewed their terrorist attacks against civilians in southeastern ethnic Balouchi region of Iran which borders Pakistan’s Balouchistan province. Although Pakistan suffers from a by far worse security condition in its own tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, to the extent that it presents the impression of a failed state to observers in those regions, it is capable of providing wider cooperation to Iran in fighting cross-border terrorism by dismantling Jundallah’s terrorist network in its border areas or allowing Iran’s security forces to use its soil in border areas to pursue and eradicate Jundallah’s terrorist elements.

Pakistani officials may think that putting a decisive end to Jundallah’s terrorist activities in its border areas may not be in their best interests as it might dampen Iran’s incentives for cooperation with Pakistan in other issue areas, especially in the energy sector, once the threat of terrorism is gone for good. In other words, Pakistan may consider its cooperation over combating cross-border terrorism as a bargaining chip for gaining economic concessions from Iran and would thus prefer to keep the option open for a long time by extending a limited rather than full-fledged security cooperation to it . While this may work in Pakistan’s interests for a short while, its drawback is that it would erode Iran’s trust and jeopardize Pakistan’s long-term interests in its relations with Iran. Under such a situation, Iran may be forced to seek a permanent and long-term solution to the threat of cross-border terrorism and thus end its reliance on security cooperation with Pakistan. Iran’s recent decision to build a concrete security fence along its entire border with Pakistan can be interpreted as a response to Pakistan’s irresolute cooperation with Iran in dismantling Jundallah’s terrorist safe haven in its border areas.

The stakes for Pakistan are high in its relations with Iran given the ongoing investment projects between the two countries in the energy sector. The existing natural gas pipe line project which is expected to become operational in 2014, will supply the bulk of Pakistan’s domestic natural gas needs from Iran’s massive South Pars gas field. Forging a strategic relationship with a neighboring country which possesses the second largest natural gas reserves in the world and is expected by official accounts to supply ten percent of the world’s natural gas needs in a not so distant future, owing to enormous investments in its natural gas sector over the past couple of decades, would be on top of the foreign policy agenda of every astute state leader. Pakistani politicians seem to be looking to that horizon despite some contradictory signals emanating from Islamabad every now and then, as in the case of their recent dispatch of security personnel to Bahrain .

　

Celebrating Nowruz in Tehran: Persian identity in Iranian diplomacy

Heads of regional states celebrating Nowruz in Tehran, March 2011

This article is simultaneously published in Foreign Policy Journal, American Chronicle and Middle East Online.

While the world's attention has been focused the nuclear crisis in Japan and the ongoing political turmoil in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Iran has been engaged in summit diplomacy in recent days, hosting five heads of state and several other high-level political officials from regional countries, and commemorating Nowruz, the ancient cultural tradition marking the start of the Persian new year synchronizing with the beginning of spring. The hosting of this event by Iran is in large part thought to send the unmistakable message to the world that despite the claim of its adversaries to the contrary, Iran is too important and influential a nation to be isolated, at least in its own region. Regardless of its actual and symbolic significance to politicians, the hosting of the Nowruz international festival in Tehran and the political incidents surrounding it provide insights into how the Islamic and Persian elements of the Iranian national identity interact to influence its foreign policy.

By now the world is too familiar with the Islamic or ideological sources of Iran’s foreign policy, yet scant attention is paid to how the Persian element of Iran’s national identity plays out in its diplomacy. The Persian element of Iran’s national identity has for a long time influenced Iran’s relations with its Muslim, especially Arab, neighbors by defining it as ‘the other’ at different points in its history. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 which brought political independence to the Central Asian and South Caucasus republics opened up new avenues through which the Persian element of Iran’s national identity could influence its foreign policy alongside its Islamic component.

The fact that most of the newly-independent countries of the region belonged to the Iranian civilization zone and shared historical and cultural ties with Iran meant that the Persian element of Iran’s national identity could serve as a gateway for Iran’s influence in these countries. Common cultural and literary heritage could work as a bridge across political boundaries between Iran and these nations. Just to name a few, the Persian literary masterpieces of Roudaki, Ferdowsi, Roumi, Hafez and Saadi, some of which were produced over a millennium ago, are still recited and cherished by the Persian-speaking peoples across Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and some other parts of the Central Asia. To indicate the importance of this region also to ‘the self’ of Iran, it helps to note that the national identity of Iran would miss important elements without including the historical cultural heritage of Iran which rests in the historical cities and regions of Bukhara, Samarqand, Khojand, Merv, Balkh, Herat and their like, all of which are located outside the borders of the contemporary Iran .

Common cultural heritage has endowed Iran with a political capital which can be used for diplomacy purposes. The successful experience of Iran in mediating a peace accord , along with Russia, between the Tajik warring parties in the mid-1990s, which brought an end to the civil war in that Persian-speaking nation through a power-sharing arrangement, bears witness to how Persian cultural elements could serve Iran’s foreign diplomacy.

However, despite some isolated cases of its successful application, the Persian element of Iran’s national identity has been underutilized in its foreign diplomacy. The main reason for this has been the absence of consensus among Iranian political and religious elites on how different components of the Iranian national identity should be balanced and factored in defining Iran’s foreign policy. There is a perception among some segments of the conservative Iranian elites that the Persian and Islamic elements of Iran’s national identity are incompatible and that promoting the pre-Islamic Persian culture would undermine the Islamic component of Iran’s national identity.

The opposition to the promotion of the Persian component of Iran’s national identity is not purely ideological and is also in large part driven by power politics considerations. There is a concern among some conservative political groups that any emphasis on the Persian element of the Iranian national identity in both domestic politics and foreign policy would bolster the position of secular nationalist political forces at the expense of Islamist forces in the Iranian politics. This concern was at its peak in the first few years of the post-revolutionary politics in Iran when Islamist political forces were embroiled in an intense power struggle with liberal nationalist political forces.

The recent political reactions by various hard-line political and religious figures to the planned international commemoration of Nowruz in Tehran is yet further evidence pointing to the absence of a political consensus among Iranian political elites on the role of Persian identity in Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy and show how internal power struggle has hampered Iran’s efforts in utilizing its Persian identity to advance its national interests and foreign policy goals.

A look at the statements of various political and religious officials who took an opposing position on the holding of the recent international Nowruz event in Tehran shows that several motives were at play. Some justified their opposition to the event by claiming that there is an inherent conflict between the promotion of Persian culture and Islamic identity of Iran while a larger number of them argued that the holding of the event is not politically expedient at this juncture given the political developments in the Arab world. Not lost in the various reasons mentioned for opposition to the event was the fact that a controversial political figure namely Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who is a close aide to President Ahmadinejad, was behind organizing the event. This makes particular sense knowing that Mashaei has stirred the wrath of the conservative political and religious officials by making nationalistic statements in recent years .

The absence of political consensus among Iranian elites on the extent to which the Persian component of Iran’s national identity should be incorporated in Iran’s foreign diplomacy either on ideological or practical grounds has led to the underutilization of Iran’s potentials in foreign relations with regional countries . Stressing only the Islamic element of Iran’s national identity in situations where Iran’s national interests could be better served by promoting its Persian identity has cost Iran opportunities in its foreign relations. Resistance to Iran’s influence in some of the former Soviet republics in the Central Asia and the Caucasus can in large part be attributed to the prevalence of this approach to Iran’s foreign policy. Given that most of the secular post-Soviet states of the region deal with Islamist opposition forces, it comes as no surprise that an unbalanced emphasis on Iran’s Islamic identity at the expense of its Persian identity in foreign policy has presented Iran as a threat to some of these states.

The international celebration of Nowruz in Tehran which also follows its recognition by the United Nations as an international day last year, is a step toward redressing the past shortcomings and utilizing Iran’s potentials in foreign diplomacy. Persian culture including Nowruz is an essential and undeniable element of Iran’s national identity along with its Islamic element which has survived through millennia against all odds. Notwithstanding domestic opposition by some conservative political circles, it is the belief of a large segment of the Iranian political elites that capitalizing on this potential in foreign diplomacy will serve Iran’s national interests in the region and beyond, a fact which explains why Iran took the initiative along with some other countries at the UN General Assembly in late 2009 to give official international recognition to Nowruz.

Neither Gadhafi nor West: Iran’s stance on Libyan crisis

The Western air strikes on Libya has created a dilemma situation for Iran’s foreign policy-makers. Unlike some leftist Latin American countries, particularly Venezuela, which publicly sided with Gadhafi’s regime since public riots started in Libya and condemned the protests as the plot of Western imperialist powers, Iran officially embraced the protests movement as reflecting the popular will of the Libyan people. From early on, Iran expressed its solidarity with the Libyan people by calling the popular uprising against the Gadhafi regime as a ‘noble move’ and by referring to the slain protestors as ‘martyrs’. Accordingly, Iranian officials condemned Gadhafi’s violent crackdown on the opposition forces and went as far as denouncing Gadhafi as a ‘lunatic’ .

Iran initially saw the prospect of the Gadhafi regime falling quickly in the face of mounting public protests in Libya and being replaced by a more friendly government. While extending its full verbal support to the Libyan protesters, Iran remained wary of Western intentions towards Libya from early on. The general concern among Iranian officials has been that Western powers, especially the US, may opportunistically use the protection of civilians as a pretext for building military foothold in Libya and influencing political processes in that country with a view to installing a pro-Western puppet regime there . It was in this vein that Iran’s parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, stated that “We warn the Libyan dictator that fighting the will of a nation means moving on a two-edged sword and becoming a scapegoat for the United States' temptations and hegemonic aspirations”.

Along the same lines, a number of high-ranking Iranian military and political officials also warned Western powers from early on against any military action against Libya. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Ramin Mehmanparast, aptly articulated Iran’s concern in a recent press conference by stating that “they Western powers} are pursuing their own interests which are based on dominance over other nations, the establishment of military bases and continuation of colonialism in its modern form". While welcoming the imposition of the no-fly zone on Libya, Iranian officials also voiced their strong opposition to the military strikes by Western powers against Libya with the aim of enforcing the no-fly zone.

However, as it has become clear that the rebel forces are not capable of overcoming the Gadhafi regime by themselves and as Gadhafi has shown to be unrestrained in the use of violence against the protestors, the dilemma poses itself for Iran and a number of other like-minded states as to how to prevent further massacre of civilians at the hands of the Gadhafi regime while preventing the Western powers from being militarily involved in Libya. In an attempt to offer a solution to the existing dilemma facing Iran and some other countries regarding their position on the Libyan crisis, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, suggested today in a speech on the occasion of Nowruz, that instead of direct military intervention in Libya Western powers should arm the rebel forces to topple the Gadhafi regime themselves. Regardless of how effective such a proposed solution can be in swiftly dealing with the ongoing crisis in Libya, Khamenei’s statement highlights Iran’s anxiety over the prospects of the Libyan popular uprising being hijacked by the Western powers.

It is of course not the first time that Iran has faced a dilemma in its foreign policy towards regional countries. US wars against the Taliban regime and Saddam’s Iraq were the most prominent cases over the past decade in which Iran faced a dilemma situation. In both cases Iran tried to reconcile the dilemma by adopting a critical public posture against the US while aiding the opposition forces in those countries to topple their incumbent regimes . However, unlike the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality is that Iran does not have sufficient resources to effectively influence political developments in North Africa and in large part has to content itself with issuing diplomatic statements on the unfolding events in that region .

Strategic implications of Iran’s naval presence in the Mediterranean sea

An Iranian naval ship crossing the Suez canal, Photo by Reuters

*This article is simultaneously published in Foreign policy Journal, On Line Opinion, Middle East Online and American Chronicle

The recent passage of two Iranian naval ships through the Suez canal for the first time since the Iranian revolution of 1979 has drawn large media attention in the West and Israel. In a reaction to this development, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated “we can see what an unstable region we live in, a region in which Iran tries to exploit the situation that has been created in order to expand its influence by passing warships through the Suez canal". Israeli vice prime minister, Silvan Shalom, also said that “the timing of the crossing was an unmistakable message from Iran that it is attempting to expand its influence in the region”. "The objective is to signal to the leaders of the Arab world who the new leader is in the Middle East," Shalom said.

Given the degree of sensitivity exhibited by Israel to this, it is important to know why Iran has decided to send its naval ships to the Mediterranean Sea after well over three decades and what significance and implications would this move entail in the long run. The evidence shows that it was a sheer coincidence that Iranian ships have crossed the Suez canal at the height of political upheavals in the region. The decision by Iran to dispatch its naval ships to the Mediterranean sea was obviously taken well before Mubarak was ousted from power. Iranian ships reportedly embarked on their journey in mid January when there was no indication that the Egyptian dictator was falling any time soon. However, Iranian officials tried to use the presence of their naval ships in the region as a signal to Israeli leaders warning them against any military adventures in light of the ongoing turmoil in the region. It was in this vein that the chairman of the Iranian chiefs of staff, General Firouzabadi, warned the Egyptian military commanders about the possibility of the seizure of the Sinai peninsula and the Suez canal by Israeli forces in light of the uncertain future political order in Egypt .

Regardless of its short-term and symbolic significance, the presence of the Iranian naval ships in the Mediterranean sea signifies Iran’s increased confidence and assertiveness in conducting naval operations in areas far away from its own coasts. Iran has traditionally limited its naval operations to the Persian Gulf and to the Sea of Oman . However, over the past two years Iran has conducted a number of naval operations in the Gulf of Aden combating Somali pirates. The first group of Iranian naval ships were deployed to the Gulf of Aden in 2008 after several incidents of piracy against Iranian cargo ships and oil tankers by Somali pirates. Iran has since dispatched several other groups of naval ships on the same mission to the Gulf of Aden. These experiences have admittedly boosted the confidence and the skills of the Iranian navy in conducting similar operations and having presence in distant seas.

It is not clear whether Iran is considering to deploy more naval ships to the area in the future and to establish a longer-term naval presence in the Mediterranean sea. It has lately been reported that Iranian and Syrian naval authorities have signed an agreement paving the way for broader naval cooperation between the two countries, including the possibility of additional Iranian ships visiting Syrian ports in the future. The prospects of any long-term and, more importantly, larger naval presence in the Mediterranean sea by Iran will surely be unnerving to Israel .

Regardless of whether Iran is seriously considering such options, any long-term naval presence of Iran in the Mediterranean sea will have significant implications for Iran-Israel relations as well as for broader Middle East politics. The most obvious implication would be that Iran’s naval presence in the Mediterranean sea will put the military forces of the two countries in a direct contact zone. Under present conditions, there is no possibility of face-to-face military confrontation between the two countries as they share neither land nor sea borders with one another . Any possible military confrontation between the two countries is currently limited to missile and aerial strikes on each other or war through proxies. Not that Iran’s naval presence in the Mediterranean sea at any size will make an all-out war possible between Iran and Israel, it will increase the possibilities of limited direct military conflict between the two countries.

Increased possibility of limited direct military conflict between the two countries will in turn entail other implications. One main implication of Iran’s long-term naval presence in the Mediterranean sea will be that Iran will have more retaliation options in the event of an Israeli military strike on its nuclear facilities. In a hypothetical military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel will first need to neutralize Iranian naval ships and submarines in the area. Israel already faces viable retaliation options by Iran which act as deterrence against any possible attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, but Iran’s naval presence in the Mediterranean sea will bolster the existing deterrence and will make such an attack seem even more daunting for Israel.

By the same token, the long-term naval presence of Iran in the Mediterranean sea will also raise the costs of any future military aggression by Israel against Iranian allies in the region. As the Hezbollah-Israel war in the summer of 2006 demonstrated, Iranian options to support its allies in the face of an Israeli military aggression have been limited to diplomatic and logistical supports. Any naval presence in the Mediterranean sea will make it harder for Iran to remain on the sidelines in the event of a military attack by Israel on Iran’s allies in the region. It is true that a handful of Iranian naval ships and submarines cannot exert decisive damage on Israel and thus deter it from military action when its vital interests are at stake, but they can limit Israel’s room for maneuver in the region by raising the costs of its military confrontations in the future. Having made these points, it remains to be seen what trajectory regional events take in the upcoming months.

Russia’s new policy shift on Iran’s nuclear issue

 

 *This article is simulatenously published in the Middle East Online and American Chronicle.

Russian officials have made a series of statements on Iran’s nuclear program over the past several weeks which highlight a significant shift in their balancing position between Iran and the West. The most recent statement to that end was made by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev last week at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. In a statement countering the dominant conception of Iran’s nuclear program in the West, Medvedev remarked that there is no proof that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons . This statement came a few days after President Medvedev held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, discussing bilateral relations and Iran’s nuclear program and after Iran’s Vienna-based envoy to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, traveled to Moscow in mid January to hold talks with Russian policy-makers over Iran’s nuclear program.

As in the case of similar statements challenging the conventional view of the Western political elites toward Iran’s nuclear program, Medvedev’s recent statement unsurprisingly did not receive coverage by the mainstream Western media. The censorship of Medvedev’s recent statement by the mainstream Western media does not of course detract from the importance of Russia’s new position on Iran’s nuclear issue.

Medvedev’s recent statement on Iran’s nuclear issue is not the only evidence pointing to a shift in Russia’s balancing act between Iran and the West. Other lower Russian officials have also made similar statements with the same effect regarding Iran’s nuclear issue over the past several weeks. The recent warm-up in Russia-Iran relations follows a period of tensions between the two countries which emerged after Russia, under pressure from Israel and the Unites States, reneged on its commitment to deliver S-300 surface to air missile system to Iran and after it joined the Western powers in voting for another round of Security Council sanctions against Iran in June 2010 .

The recent shift in Russia’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear issue can be understood in the context of the changing international circumstances overseeing Iran’s nuclear issue. Since Iran’s nuclear activities turned into a full-blown international issue several years ago, Russia has played a double game in order to secure its national interests in relation to both Iran and the West . First, Russia has had to be cooperative with the Western powers at the UN Security Council in order to have a say in formulating international policies shaping political outcomes around the world and also to use its cooperation with the West as a bargaining tool to gain concessions from it in other issue areas, such as its relations with the NATO and economic cooperation with the Western countries. This would make particular sense for Russia’s interests as its non-cooperation with the Western powers would have induced them to bypass the Security Council and to seek alternative arrangements dealing with Iran‘s nuclear issue , which would exclude Russia. Second, Russia , at the same time, also had to appear supportive of Iran by watering down the tone of the sanctions resolutions in order to preserve its strategic relations with it.

　

In practice, however, walking a fine line between Iran and the West has not always played out safely for Russia as it has involved the constant risk of alienating one party to the benefit of the other. Indeed this turned out to be the case last June when President Ahmadinejad of Iran publicly expressed his frustration with Russia over its vote for the last Security Council resolution against Iran, even after it had significantly watered down the language of the resolution. Iran’s anger at Russia for its perceived betrayal was not confined to public statements by Iranian officials. Iran’s initial practical response to Russia’s shifting position on Iran’s nuclear issue as well as its refusal to deliver S-300 anti-aircraft missile system to it was to order all Russian commercial pilots working in Iran to leave . Even though, non-political reasons were mentioned for terminating the work contract of Russian pilots in Iran, the timing and the publicity surrounding this announcement could not fail to reveal Iran’s political motives.

Apart from concerns about further backlash against its economic interests in Iran and its eagerness to maintain its strategic ties with it, the recent shift in Russia’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program is also driven by the US unilateral approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue in recent months, including imposing further tough sanctions on Iran through bilateral arrangements with other countries. At a recent press conference held jointly with Turkish foreign minister, Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, referred to unilateral sanctions against Iran as a spoiler and expressed hope that they would be lifted in the nuclear talks between Iran and the P-5+1 countries, which was held recently in Istanbul . Along the same lines, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also stated recently that sanctions against Iran are futile and that the only way to deal with Iran's nuclear issue is diplomacy.

Regardless of Russia’s principled opposition to crippling economic sanctions against Iran, it would particularly oppose any arrangements dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue to which Russia is not a part. As the US takes a more unilateral approach to dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue, Russia will find itself more leaning toward Iran and is expected to work to undermine those additional punitive measures against Iran which are formulated outside the context of the UN Security Council.

Iran-P-5+1 nuclear talks conclude in Istanbul; what led to the failure?

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and EU  foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton ,at the recent Istanbul meeting, Photo by Reuters



The latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P-5+1 countries, comprising the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, concluded today Jan 22, in Istanbul, Turkey, without any specific agreement. As usual , the mainstream Western media are busy attributing the failure of the recent talks to Iran’s alleged intransigence while turning a blind eye to the inflexible and unreasonable position of Western powers in regard to Iran’s nuclear issue.

To see what led to this failure, let’s examine what brought each party to the negotiating table in the first place . Western officials were interested in discussing two main issues with their Iranian counterparts at the Istanbul meeting , namely Iran’s uranium enrichment program and nuclear fuel swap. The first item was a non-starter for negotiations as Iran had agreed in the previous round in Geneva, to continue the talks on only common grounds. As Western officials could well anticipate, Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was not a matter of common grounds and thus not up for negotiations, as Iranian officials had publicly warned about weeks before the Istanbul meeting.

Iran’s position that it has the right under the NPT to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes and that it is not ready to negotiate over its obvious rights has become a cornerstone of its nuclear policy over the past several years. Iran has also actualized its goal of developing nuclear fuel cycle technology by developing industrial-scale enrichment facilities over the past decade. In light of these realities, various Western political think tanks and prominent American Iran specialists had warned the American officials in recent months that it would be unrealistic for the Western powers to expect Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program .

As in contrast to its Western interlocutors, Iran tried to focus discussions on common grounds, which included items such as nuclear disarmament, scientific nuclear cooperation, Israel’s nuclear arsenal and so forth. Not surprisingly, the Western officials were lackluster about discussing these issues, as they perceived them as tangential to their main agenda. Iran was also ready to resume talks on its nuclear fuel swap proposal at the Istanbul meeting, taking into account the new realities that have emerged since it initially tabled its proposal.

The nuclear fuel swap issue had the potential to salvage the recent nuclear talks in Istanbul. Iran had initially offered to exchange most of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile in return for ready fuel rods for its research reactor in Tehran back in October 2009 and later again in May 2010 (as part of a deal negotiated between Turkey and Brazil on the one side and Iran on the other). Western powers had rejected both of these offers by Iran and had pressed ahead with further Security Council sanctions against it. Iran had meant its nuclear fuel swap offers to be confidence-building measures in part in order to allay Western powers’ concern that it might be pursuing nuclear weapons and also to prevent further sanctions against it .

Despite some hopes for a rudimentary agreement on the issue of nuclear fuel swap, Western powers proved in the recent talks in Istanbul that they were not prepared to adjust their calculations and have realistic expectations about a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran either. Western negotiators still wanted to finalize the deal with Iran on the same terms that was proposed in October 2009, not taking into account the new realities, including further multilateral and bilateral sanctions imposed on Iran. Put differently, Western powers wished to strip Iran of most, if not all, of its LEU stockpile and at the same time maintain the sanctions that they have imposed on it since then and even threaten it with more sanctions.

Given the original purpose of the nuclear fuel swap proposal by Iran and the fact that Iran has produced more LEU since then, it is reasonable for Iranian negotiators to have expected the Western powers to recognize Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear fuel cycle under the NPT and ease sanctions on it in return for giving up most of its LEU stockpile. Any deal that would not meet these minimum requirements, could not be sold by Iranian nuclear negotiators to their constituency back in Iran.

The failure of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and Western powers is yet another evidence that Western politicians are not yet willing to adjust their expectations in light of the realities on the ground. This has made the Western position with regard to Iran’s nuclear program seem even more unreasonable and unrealistic. Western officials had hoped in vain to reap the fruits of their intensified sanctions against Iran in the recent nuclear talks in Istanbul. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, had even attributed the very fact of Iran coming to the negotiating table to her policy of tightening sanctions. But as I had argued earlier in my previous works, these hopes were not to see the light of day and that the Western confrontational policy towards Iran was only likely to further toughen Iran’s position on its nuclear issue and thus bring about a lose-lose outcome.

　

　

A time not for celebrating victory over Iran

President Ahmadinejad touring Iran's uranium enrichment center at Natanz

* This article is simultaneously published in Foreign Policy Journal, American Chronicle, Online Opinion and OpEdNews.

Over the past few days, the dominant mood of Israeli media has been one of euphoria and celebration over the recent announcement by the outgoing Israeli intelligence chief, Meir Dagan, that even under worst-case scenarios Iran will not be able to build nuclear weapons at least by 2015. Referring to the latest revised assessment by Dagan of the chances of nuclear weapon development by Iran and similar adjusted assessments over the past decade, an Israeli intelligence analyst writes, “These adjustments were not the result of mistaken evaluations, but due to the difficulties Iran has encountered in advancing its program, largely because of the Mossad’s efforts”.

Along similar lines, another Israeli self-identified ‘dove’ political analyst expresses his content with Dagan’s recent announcement by writing, “although blowing up some Iranian facilities and killing a few Iranian scientists were risky acts of aggression, they were worth it. They contributed to the hobbling of Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, pushed its goal off by at least several years, so these acts of sabotage and assassination were justified,”.

These celebratory observations do not only characterize the mood of Israeli media and politicians . Many Western media and politicians also feel euphoric at the thought of Iranian nuclear program being disrupted by covert acts of sabotage. To cite only one example, Washington Post wrote in a recent editorial reflecting on Dagan’s recent assessment that, “there appear to be solid reasons to conclude that U.N. and other Western sanctions and covert operations have hindered the Iranian program” and that “without more advanced centrifuges, Iran would have trouble in any attempt to create a bomb out of the low-enriched uranium it has stockpiled”.

What accounts for this celebratory mood at the exaggerated news of damage to Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities is the now-too-familiar assumption that Iran is hell bent on developing nuclear weapons and that the fact that Iran has not so far built nuclear bombs is because of the joint Western and Israeli covert operations and pressures. If anyone happens to ask Israeli or western politicians as to what evidence they have to believe that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons, the familiar answer would be that it is Iran’s job to prove that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. In other words and absurdly enough, Iran is presumed guilty unless proved otherwise. This explains why, under pressure from world powers, the IAEA periodic reports over Iran’s nuclear program routinely state that they are not yet able to fully establish that there is no military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program, rather than simply stating that there is no evidence that Iran’s nuclear program has military dimensions. The international controversy over Iran’s nuclear program simply boils down to this unverified assumption that Iran is determined to produce nuclear bombs.

　

However, no one among Western politicians seems to want to consider this plausible argument that the fact that Iran has not yet developed nuclear weapons is not because of technical difficulties or covert Mossad and CIA operations but simply because Iran has no intention of building nuclear bombs. The reports of IAEA inspectors and other nuclear experts have acknowledged the fact that Iran has long achieved mastery over uranium enrichment. IAEA’s Iran safeguard reports also verify that Iran has enriched uranium more efficiently over time and that the average monthly output of its enriched uranium has been increasing despite reports of Iran’s centrifuges being contaminated with the Stuxnet malware.

Iran also demonstrated its technical capability and skill to enrich uranium to higher levels by producing a sample batch of 20- percent level enriched uranium on a short notice last year. This was carried out upon Western countries’ refusal to supply fuel for Tehran nuclear research reactor producing medical isotopes for cancer patients in return for the exchange of the bulk of Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile. IAEA reports have also verified that Iran has so far produced 40 kilograms of 20-percent level enriched uranium under the supervision of its inspectors. Despite its technical capability to enrich uranium to even a weapon-grade level, Iran has not gone beyond enriching uranium to a level suitable for use in nuclear power plants.

Iran also voluntarily offered to exchange most of its existing low-enriched uranium stockpile in return for fuel rods for its Tehran research reactor. This was purely a voluntary and confidence-building measure by Iran, as no international rules require Iran to give up its low-enriched uranium in return for purchasing ready fuel rods. Western officials did not even seem to wonder why a country that is allegedly bent on developing nuclear bombs soon would want to voluntarily give up most of its low-enriched uranium stockpile. Yet, Western governments did not seize on this opportunity to strike a deal with Iran and instead pushed ahead with another round of Security Council sanctions against it.

A direct consequence of the Western confrontational policy toward Iran was that Iran was forced to start producing its own 20-percent level enriched uranium, as required in the process of building fuel rods for Tehran research reactor. Had the Western governments not gone ahead with imposing tighter sanctions on Iran and had they accepted Iran’s offer, Iran would not have mastered enriching uranium to 20 percent level now. This serves as a reminder that further tough measures by Western governments against Iran is only likely to further strengthen Iran’s resolve and push it to become more self-sufficient in nuclear technology.

　　

The unwarranted suspicion that Iran is bent on developing nuclear bombs has complicated the resolution of Iran’s nuclear issue and is likely to lead concerned parties on more dangerous paths in the future. Covert operations allegedly undertaken by western and Israeli intelligence agencies in the form of creating and spreading computer malwares and sponsoring terrorist attacks against Iranian nuclear scientists with a view to disrupting Iran’s nuclear program are extremely risky adventures which may entail grave consequences for the settlement of Iran’s nuclear issue. Iran’s fingers are already pointed at Israel, the U.S. and Britain for the assassination of its nuclear scientists. To say the least, Iranian response to these overt and covert acts of hostility against its nuclear program will not be positive.

While killing the chances of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, the covert Israeli and Western operations against Iran’s nuclear program are also not likely to achieve their intended goal of disrupting Iran’s nuclear program. The main reason for this observation is that nuclear experts closely monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities do not share the exaggerated view of the Israeli and Western politicians and media of the extent of damage caused to Iran’s enrichment facilities by the Stuxnet computer worm. A technical report issued on December 22, 2010 by a team of nuclear experts at the Institute for Science and International Security on the impact of Stuxnet computer worm on Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities concludes that Stuxnet may have succeeded in disrupting a limited number of Iranian centrifuges temporarily but if the goal of Stuxnet was to quickly destroy all the centrifuges at Natanz enrichment center it failed. IAEA reports also indicate that the monthly low-enriched uranium output at Natanz flattened but never came to a halt from mid 2008 to late 2009 and that it has substantially increased ever since.

To say the least, these acts of covert sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program are inimical to the very spirit of diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving Iran’s nuclear issue. They are likely to further strengthen Iranian resolve in pursuing its uranium enrichment program and create more domestic public support for Iran’s nuclear program. Not to mention various retaliation options available to Iran, these acts of hostility toward Iran are also likely to force Iran to limit its cooperation with the IAEA in order to minimize harm to its nuclear program . Taking these consequences and realities into account, there should be no reason for celebration by all concerned.

Elite and public perception in Turkey and Arab countries towards Iran

A recent public opinion survey of Turkish citizens has found that Turks consider not Iran but the U.S., followed by Israel, as their major national security threat. Joe Parkinson, a Wall Street Journal reporter, writes, “According to a wide-ranging survey carried out by the Ankara-based MetroPOLL Strategic and Social Research Center in December, some 43% of Turks said they perceive the U.S. as the country’s biggest threat, followed by Israel, with 24%. Just 3% of those surveyed considered Iran a major threat”.

Given the absence of any military conflict between Iran and Turkey in the modern history and the relatively autonomous foreign policy orientation of Turkey under prime minister Erdogan, it should not come as a surprise that both Turkish citizens and political elites do not consider Iran as a security threat. These survey results also indicate that the relentless demonization of Iran by Western politicians and media and their characterization of Iran’s nuclear program as a serious threat to regional security have had no considerable impact on the attitude of Turkish citizens toward Iran. Turkey is a case in point in the region where the threat perception of its elites and its public largely converge. The release of these survey results also follow the decision of the Turkish government early last year to remove Iran from the list of countries that pose potential security concern to Turkey.

The relationship between elite and public threat perception in Turkey stands in sharp contrast to that in most Arab countries in the region. The threat perception of political elites in most Arab countries drastically diverges from that of their publics. While autocratic Arab rulers, as WikiLeaks-revealed documents indicate, hold a lop-sided perception of their national security threat and privately lobby the U.S. government for military action against Iran’s nuclear program, Arab masses hold diametrically opposite view of Iran’s role in the region . According to recent public opinion surveys, the overwhelming majority of Arab masses in the region do not consider Iran’s nuclear program and even, hypothetically speaking, a nuclear-armed Iran a threat to their national security. Increased democratic accountability and autonomous foreign policy orientation on the part of Arab political elites is expected to produce the same type of relationship between elite and public threat perception in those countries that exists in Turkey today. To read the full report on the recent survey of Turkish citizens, click here .